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ABSTRACT
The 1951 Durham-Humphrey Amendments limited the FDA’s power over the Rx-OTC decision by
enacting an objective deﬁnition of a prescription drug that would be applied primarily by drug manufacturers.
Under this regime, Congress likely intended the Rx-OTC decision to be limited to consideration of medical
or scientiﬁc harms so as to insure the most limited role for the FDA, maximize the ability of the public
to self-medicate, and insure consistency in diﬀerent manufacturer’s Rx-OTC determinations. However, the
1962 Drug Amendments expanded the FDA’s power regarding Rx to OTC switches by requiring the FDA to
balance the costs and beneﬁts of a drug to determine whether it was in the best interest of society for the drug
to be marketed OTC. Thus, social harms are appropriate considerations for the Rx-OTC decision if they
are true societal costs of a drug, speciﬁcally, if they are quantiﬁable, generally accepted, and a reasonable
1probability. Applying these lessons to the proposed Rx to OTC switch of the emergency contraceptive Plan
B, the FDA seems to have exceeded its authority by considering social harms—increased teen promiscuity
and decreased teen condom use—that are not reasonably probable. Moreover, by failing to acknowledge
that it was considering social harms the FDA threatened the transparency necessary to administrative
accountability.
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I.
“I can assure you that this decision will not be based on politics. It will be based on science,” said then-
Acting Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) Leslie Crawford in the Senate hearings
on his nomination to be Commissioner.1 He was referring to the FDA’s determination as to whether to
approve Plan B, an emergency contraceptive commonly referred to as the “morning-after pill,” for over-the-
counter (“OTC”) sale.2 The Plan B decision is perhaps the most controversial decision the FDA has ever
made. It has sparked intense scrutiny of the FDA by the media, members of Congress, social conservatives,
and reproductive rights advocates. It has won the FDA praise from pro-life advocates and those favoring
“traditional” social values, while at the same time it has led to criticism of the FDA from liberals and
1Gardiner Harris, F.D.A.’s Role in Delaying Contraceptive is Criticized, N.Y. Times, March 18, 2005, at A16, 2005 WLNR
4194704.
2Plan B was approved for prescription use in 1999 and consists of two pills of levonorgestrel, a synthetic hormone found in
birth control pills. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA’s Decision Regarding
Plan B: Questions and Answers (2004), at 1, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/planB/planBQandA.htm [hereinafter
Plan B Q&A]. Plan B primarily acts to prevent ovulation, but it may also prevent fertilization or implantation of a fertilized
egg in the womb. Id. The ﬁrst pill should be taken as soon as possible after intercourse, but no more than 72 hours later, and
the second pill should be taken 12 hours after the ﬁrst. See Marcia Crosse, Food and Drug Administration: Decision Process to
Deny Initial Application for Over-the-Counter Marketing of the Emergency Contraceptive Drug Plan B Was Unusual, GAO
Rep. No. 06-109, at 12 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]. Plan B can reduce the
risk of pregnancy by 89% when used within 72 hours of intercourse. Id.
5those committed to reproductive “freedom.” It has caused internal divisions within the FDA, including the
resignation of the senior FDA oﬃcial responsible for women’s issues. It has delayed the conﬁrmation of two
diﬀerent nominees for FDA Commissioner. And it has led to an administrative impasse within the FDA. As
of May 2006, it had been 16 months since the target date for the FDA’s second decision on Plan B and over
three years since the OTC switch was ﬁrst proposed and yet no ﬁnal decision had been made.
Despite Dr. Crawford’s assurances, many observers, both within the FDA and in the general public, believe
that the delay on Plan B and the actions that the FDA has taken thus far were motivated by political
considerations and concerns over social issues unrelated to medical or scientiﬁc harm. In particular, they
allege the decision (or lack thereof) is inﬂuenced by the opposition of the Bush Administration and social
conservatives to abortion or, at the very least, dislike by these same groups of increased sexual activity.3 This
raises interesting and important questions that this paper endeavors to answer: what are the appropriate
factors for the FDA to consider in making the prescription (“Rx”) to OTC decision? Speciﬁcally, is the FDA
limited to considering medical or scientiﬁc evidence and harms or can it also consider questions of social
policy and social harms?
Answering these questions involves the diﬃcult task of separating social harms from medical and scientiﬁc
harms. Unfortunately, there is no clear line where questions of science or medicine give way to questions of
morality and social policy. Perhaps the best deﬁnition that can be formulated, and one that works eﬀectively
in the vast majority of cases, is the deﬁnition used by Justice Potter Stewart to deﬁne hard core pornography:
“I know it when I see it....”4 Certain questions are clearly medical or scientiﬁc (does the drug’s toxicity make
it dangerous? will the drug interact dangerously with other drugs?) while other questions are clearly social
3See Editorial, Science or Politics at the F.D.A.?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2004, at A24, 2004 WLNR 5575199.
4Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
6(will Rx or OTC make the drug the most aﬀordable to consumers? will a switch to OTC status make the
drug unproﬁtable and thereby discourage development by the pharmaceutical industry?). As to cases where
Justice Stewart’s deﬁnition provides no help, a rough line can be drawn: medical/scientiﬁc harms relate to
eﬀects on the body while social harms relate to eﬀects on the behavior of the relevant actors (consumers,
doctors, pharmaceutical companies, politicians, etc.).
Unsurprisingly, given the controversy it has engendered and the diﬃculty the FDA is having in making a
decision, the major concerns over Plan B do not easily fall into either category. At least one concern sup-
porters of OTC status for Plan B allege is motivating the FDA’s decision5 is easily categorizable as a social
harm: the opposition of social conservatives and the Bush White House based on their dislike of abortion.
However, the main concerns asserted by the FDA, that easier access to Plan B will increase teen promiscuity
and decrease teen condom use,6 toe the line between science or medicine and social harms. On their face,
they appear to be questions of social harm because they relate to the behavior of Plan B’s consumers. There
is nothing inherently threatening to the body about teen sexual activity; its appropriateness depends on
a person’s view of morality and social issues. Likewise, decreased condom use does not cause direct harm
to the body. However, just below the surface, these questions are closely tied to science and medicine. A
major concern about teen promiscuity and decreased condom use is that they will lead to an increase in
STD transmission, which, like increased incidents of any disease, is clearly a medical question because of
the negative eﬀect on the body. Thus, the concerns raised by the Plan B debate range the spectrum from
clearly social (opposition to abortion) to likely social (increased promiscuity and decreased condom use) to
clearly medical (increased transmission of STDs). Despite its inexactness, a relatively eﬀective line between
medical/scientiﬁc harms and social harms can be drawn for purposes of this paper.
5See Rita Rubin, Plan B Decision Called Political, USA Today, May 9, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-
05-09-fda-morning-after x.htm.
6See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 5.
7In the original 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (“FD&C”) Act, the decision as to whether a drug was
prescription-only or available for OTC sale—and thus, the decision as to what factors to consider—was left
primarily to the manufacturer, a regime that was essentially left in place by the 1951 Durham-Humphrey
Amendments, the legislation that provided the current deﬁnition of a prescription drug.7 However, the 1962
Drug Amendments, among many other changes, required the FDA to approve all new OTC drugs and review
all OTC drugs introduced to the market since 1938.8 This gives the FDA the role of determining what criteria
to consider in making the Rx-OTC decision and applying the Durham-Humphrey Amendments’ standard,
which currently deﬁnes a prescription drug as: 1) a drug which is not safe for use except under professional
supervision “because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful eﬀect, or the method of its use, or the
collateral measures necessary to its use”; 2) a drug which is limited by its new drug application (“NDA”)
to use under professional supervision.9 The ﬁrst provision contains the real deﬁnition of a prescription drug
and will be the focus of this paper since the second provision merely covers new drugs that meet this deﬁni-
tion.10 Now days, almost all new drugs are originally limited to prescription-only sale for several years, and
a manufacturer seeking to switch a drug to OTC status after this period will submit a supplemental NDA,
requiring the FDA to apply the deﬁnition of a prescription drug to make its decision.11
The starting point for the inquiry as to whether the FDA can consider social harms in making the Rx-OTC
decision, like many questions of statutory interpretation that lack clear textual answers, is the legislative
history of the deﬁnition of a prescription drug, and Part II provides a detailed legislative history of the
7See infra, Part IIA, Section 1; infra, Part IIB, Section 3.
8See Peter Temin, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States 125 (1980); W. Steven Pray, A
History of Nonprescription Drug Regulation 171 (2003).
921 U.S.C. §353(b)(1) (2006). The deﬁnition of a prescription drug in the Durham-Humphrey Amendments also included
those drugs designated as habit-forming under a diﬀerent provision of the FD&C Act. Durham-Humphrey Amendments of
1951, Pub. L. No. 82-215, §1, 65 Stat. 648, 648 (1951) (amended 1997). This provision was eliminated in 1997, see Food and
Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, Title I, § 126(c), 111 Stat. 2328 (1997). Neither it nor the reasons for
its elimination are relevant to this discussion.
10See Peter Barton Hutt, A Legal Framework for Future Decisions on Transferring Drugs from Prescription to Nonprescrip-
tion Status, 37 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 427, 433 (1982).
11See David E. Collins, Report of the Task Force on the Future of OTC Drugs, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 27, 27 (2000).
8Durham-Humphrey Amendments. It describes the eﬀorts of the pharmaceutical industry and its Congres-
sional supporters to achieve uniformity in the Rx-OTC determination by taking the initial decision away from
the manufacturers and giving it to the FDA. This eﬀort failed in the face of a successful counter-eﬀort by the
pharmaceutical industry and its Congressional supporters to avoid an administrative determination. Part
III takes a broader view of the legislative history, identifying four main goals of Congress—to restrain the
power of the FDA, to enact an objective rather than administrative deﬁnition, to promote self-medication,
and to eliminate reference to eﬃcacy—that all suggest that the Rx-OTC determination was meant to be
limited to consideration of medical and scientiﬁc harms, rather than social harms. Although the textual
language is broad and unclear, leaving room for reasonable assertions that social harms are an appropriate
consideration, Part III suggests that nothing in the speciﬁc language of the deﬁnition is strong enough to
overcome the contrary conclusion from the four Congressional goals.
Part IV applies the lessons learned from the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments to
conclude that the FDA’s rejection of OTC status for Plan B violated the legislative intent of the Durham-
Humphrey Amendments. However, Part V advocates a limited departure from this legislative history because
the 1962 Drug Amendments delegated to the FDA greater authority over the Rx-OTC decision than was
given in 1951. Since this departure is only justiﬁed to the extent necessary to exercise the greater powers
given to the FDA in 1962, only social harms that reﬂect real costs to society that the FDA must balance to
determine whether OTC marketing of a drug is in the best interest of society—namely, those that are quan-
tiﬁable, generally recognized as harmful, and reasonably probable—should be considered in the Rx-OTC
decision. Part V concludes that the FDA inappropriately considered social harms that were not reasonably
probable in rejecting Plan B’s OTC application, and, moreover, undermined the transparency necessary for
administrative accountability by failing to forthrightly admit that it was considering social harms.
9II.
A.
Background to the Durham-Humphrey Amendments
1.
The Development of a Prescription-Only Class of Drugs
Although prescriptions pre-dated the 20th century, the concept of a mandatory class of prescription drugs is
purely a creature of the past one hundred years. Nineteenth-century drug laws, as well as the Biologics Act
of 190212 and the Food and Drugs Act of 1906,13 focused on the quality of drugs without addressing their
availability.14 In 1914, the Harrison Narcotics Act created a mandatory class of prescription-only drugs,
though that class was limited to speciﬁc narcotic drugs.15 Thus, as Congress took up consideration of a new
food and drug law in the 1930s, prescriptions were a possibility but not a requirement—a person could buy
any non-narcotic drug from a pharmacy for self-medication without ever having seen a doctor.16
The FD&C Act of 193817 for the ﬁrst time drew a general distinction between prescription and nonpre-
scription drugs. Section 503(b) exempted “drugs dispensed on a written prescription” from certain limited
labeling requirements.18 While this provision provided an incentive towards the creation of a prescription-
1232 Stat. 728 (1902).
1334 Stat. 768 (1906).
14See Hutt, supra note 10, at 428.
1538 Stat. 785 (1914); see Hutt, supra note 10, at 428.
16See Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & Econ. 91, 91 (1979). Although it has been
suggested that the manufacturer could limit a drug to prescription status, see Hutt, supra note 10, at 428, it does not seem
like there was an eﬀective mechanism to enforce this prior to 1938.
1752 Stat. 1040 (1938); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2006).
18Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of June 25, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717 (1938), reprinted in Charles Wesley Dunn,
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: A Statement of its legislative record 14 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C.
10only category, “it did not say which drugs were to be sold by prescription or that some drugs could not be
sold without one.”19 If anything, the FD&C Act’s legislative history rejected the concept of a mandatory
class of prescription drugs, instead emphasizing the right to self-medication. The report of the House of
Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which recommended the bill to the House,
said, “The bill is not intended to restrict in any way the availability of drugs for self-medication. On the
contrary, it is intended to make self-medication safer and more eﬀective.”20 Although the FD&C Act did
somewhat limit the ability to self-medicate by keeping dangerous (non-narcotic) drugs oﬀ the market for the
ﬁrst time, people were left fully free to choose any non-dangerous, non-narcotic drug, and drugs that did
happen to be sold by a prescription were only exempted from a few minor labeling requirements.21
FDA regulations promulgated shortly after the passage of the FD&C Act created the ﬁrst general prescription-
only category of drugs. Section 502(f) of the FD&C Act required drug labels to contain adequate directions
for use and warnings against possible dangers from use, while at the same time obligating the Secretary of
Agriculture to issue regulations exempting a drug or device from this requirement if “not necessary for the
protection of the public health.”22 Pursuant to the Secretary’s delegation of authority, the FDA issued reg-
ulations exempting a drug from the use and dangers labeling requirement if it contained a prescription-only
warning, was shipped exclusively for use through a prescription, and included labeling for use that would
not be understandable to a layperson.23 If such a product was sold without a prescription, it was immedi-
§ 353(b) (2004)). Speciﬁcally, drugs dispensed on a prescription where exempted from the requirements of Section 502(b) (name
and place of business of manufacturer, distributor, or packer and quantity of contents), Section 502(e) (common or usual name),
and, under some circumstances, 502(d) (narcotics labeling). Id.
19Temin, supra note 8, at 47.
20H.R. Rep. No. 75-2139 (1938), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 18, at 822. FDA Chief Walter G. Campbell concurred in
this assessment: “There is no issue...from the standpoint of the enforcement of the Food and Drugs Act about self-medication.
This bill does not contemplate its prevention at all. If it did a single short section in the measure could have been drawn up to
that eﬀect. But what is desired...is to make self-medication safe.” Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, Hearing on S. 1944 Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 73rd Cong. (1933) (statement of Mr. Walter G. Campbell, Chief of the
Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Agriculture), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 18, at 1083.
21Temin, supra note 8, at 53.
22Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 502(f), reprinted in Dunn, supra note 18, at 13.
233 Fed. Reg. 3168 (1938).
11ately misbranded and the seller was liable for a violation of the Act.24 Underlying this regulation was an
assumption that directions for self-use could not be written for some drugs and a belief, reﬂecting the general
attitude of the New Deal, that market protections were insuﬃcient and regulatory protection of consumers
was necessary.25 Whereas Section 503(b) simply exempted a drug from limited labeling requirements if it
was actually sold via a prescription, the 1938 regulations allowed manufacturers to create a prescription-only
class of drugs simply by putting the appropriate warning on them and writing directions that could not be
understandable to the ordinary person, thereby making distribution by a pharmacist without a prescription
illegal and preventing self-medication.26 Yet, even these regulations did not make prescription-only status
mandatory for any drug or class of drugs; manufacturers were merely given an incentive, through the ex-
emption from the onerous use and dangers labeling requirements, to create a prescription-only category.
The ﬁrst truly mandatory general classiﬁcation of drugs into prescription or nonprescription categories re-
sulted from FDA regulations issued in 1944.27 Under the 1938 regulations, the only test for determining
whether a drug was prescription-only was whether the manufacturer chose to label it accordingly. Con-
trary to what might be expected, manufacturers labeled many drugs that were safe for self-medication as
prescription-only because they were able to make higher proﬁts with this limitation.28 This practice both
unduly restricted consumer access to safe and eﬀective drugs and led to confusion among pharmacists and
the public as to which products were safe for self-medication and which required supervision by a doctor.29
Due to the confusion and undue restrictions, pharmacists sold many safe drugs that bore the prescription
label with neither a prescription (in violation of the regulation) nor adequate directions and warnings for
24See id.
25Temin, supra note 8, at 49, 55.
26See id. at 47.
27Regulations promulgated in 1941 had changed the wording, but not the relevant substance, of the 1938 regulations. See 6
Fed. Reg. 1920 (1941).
28See Pray, supra note 8, at 133; Lance W. Rook, Listening to Zantac: The Role of Nonprescription Drugs in Health Care
Reform and the Federal Tax System, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 107, 126 n. 105 (1994).
29Pray, supra note 8, at 133.
12self-use.30 In response, the FDA amended the regulations in 1944 and speciﬁed a deﬁnition of a prescription-
only drug as one that, “because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful eﬀect or the method of its
use or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not generally recognized among experts qualiﬁed by
scientiﬁc training and experience to evaluate its safety and eﬃcacy, as safe and eﬃcacious for use except by
or under the supervision of a physician, dentist, or veterinarian.”31 This regulation created a mandatory
class of nonprescription drugs—those that were generally recognized among experts as safe and eﬀective
for self-medication—for which the manufacturer was not exempted from labeling requirements and that,
consequently, could not be limited to prescription-only sale.
In the late 1940s, as Congress took up what would become the Durham-Humphrey Amendments of 1951, a
mandatory division between nonprescription and prescription drugs did exist by way of regulation. Drugs
safe and eﬀective for self-medication had to be labeled for nonprescription sale. For all other drugs, the
manufacturer had a major incentive to limit them to prescription-only sale but was not required to do so.
Although this distinction was mandatory, the determination as to whether a drug was safe and eﬀective
for self-medication was left to the manufacturer in the ﬁrst instance, with the FDA limited to enforcement
actions to insure compliance.
2.
An Overview of the Durham-Humphrey Amendment Process
On April 12, 1949, Congressman Carl T. Durham, Democrat of North Carolina, introduced a bill to amend
Section 503(b) of the FD&C Act. This bill merely expanded the exemption in Section 503(b) to include all
30See Edward B. Williams, Exemption from the Requirement of Adequate Directions for Use in the Labeling of Drugs, 2
Food Drug Cosm. L.Q. 155, 159 (1947).
319 Fed. Reg. 12255 (1944); see Williams, supra note 30, at 159.
13of the labeling requirements of Section 502.32 When no action was taken on the bill during the ﬁrst session of
the 81st Congress, Congressman Durham introduced a second bill to amend Section 503(b) on June 21, 1950.
This created an exemption from most of the labeling requirements of Section 502, but limited the exemption
to a drug dispensed by prescription that was: 1) habit-forming and subject to Section 502(d); 2) found by
the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency,33 after investigation and the opportunity for a public
hearing, to be unsafe or ineﬀective for use without professional diagnosis or supervision; or 3) limited to use
under professional supervision by its eﬀective application under Section 505.34 Senator Hubert Humphrey,
Democrat of Minnesota, introduced a companion bill in the Senate containing the same language on June
29, 1950.35 Neither bill made any headway.
Having failed twice in the 81st Congress to amend Section 503(b), Congressman Durham tried a third time
at the start of the 82nd Congress, proposing H.R. 3298 on March 19, 1951.36 Senator Humphrey introduced
his companion bill, S. 1186, two days later.37 Like the 1950 bills, they oﬀered an exemption from labeling for
drugs dispensed only on a prescription but this was limited to the same three classes of drugs as in 1950.38
New to these versions (the “FDA discretion version”) were provisions that: allowed interested parties to
petition for a drug to be added to or removed from the Administrator’s list of unsafe or ineﬀective drugs;
provided for notice and comment on this petition; required a public hearing if an objection was made to the
Administrator’s decision; and allowed an appeal of the Administrator’s decision to the court system.
32H.R. 4203, 81st Cong. (1949) reprinted in 11 FDA, A Legislative History of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act and Its Amendments 1-2 (1979).
33In 1951, the FDA was part of the Federal Security Agency, which also was responsible for programs such as social security.
In 1953, the FSA was abolished and its functions transferred to the new Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In
1980, the education portion was removed and the department was renamed the Department of Health and Human Services. The
Federal Security Administrator in 1951 would be the equivalent today of the Secretary of HHS. However, since the Secretary
delegates functions to the FDA, references to the “Administrator” in the legislative history for all practical purposes should be
understood to refer today to the FDA Commissioner.
34H.R. 8904, 81st Cong. (1950), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 4-6.
35S. 3852, 81st Cong. (1950), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 9-11.
36H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 14-17.
37S. 1186, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 20-23.
38S. 1186, 82nd Cong. (1951); H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. (1951), both reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 14-23.
14The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on H.R. 3298 (“House Hearings”)
from May 1-5, 1951.39 The House Committee reported the bill favorably but signiﬁcantly amended on
July 16, 1951. Senator Humphrey had previously oﬀered an amendment to his own bill on July 5, 1951 so
that it would comport to the version reported out by the House Committee. 40 This version (the “scientiﬁc
opinion version”), like its predecessors, exempted drugs dispensed on a prescription from most of the labeling
requirements of Section 502. In addition, however, for the ﬁrst time it required that certain drugs (besides
narcotics) be dispensed only on a prescription. These drugs fell into three categories: 1) habit-forming
drugs; 2) those drugs the Administrator determined, based on generally held expert scientiﬁc opinions, to
be safe and eﬀective only under professional supervision; and 3) drugs limited to use under professional
supervision by their new drug applications (NDAs).41 The scientiﬁc opinion version retained the provision
that allowed petition by interested parties and required notice and comment, a public hearing on objection,
and judicial review. But it also required that the public hearing be for the purpose of taking testimony
from scientiﬁc experts.42 During the House ﬂoor debate on this version, an amendment that eliminated
the provision for determination by the Administrator was oﬀered by Congressman Joseph P. O’Hara (the
“O’Hara amendment”) and approved.43 The amended bill (the “enacted version”) merely provided that a
drug that was not safe for use because of the statutory standard described above could not be sold without
a prescription.44 Since the Administrator would no longer be making the Rx-OTC determination, the
provisions for petition, notice and comment, public hearings, and judicial review were unnecessary and were
eliminated. The amended bill passed the House on August 1, 1951.45
39Hearings Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, Eighty-Second Congress,
First Session, on H.R. 3298, A Bill to Amend Section 503(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [hereinafter
“House Hearings”], 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 27-229 (1979).
40See S. 1186, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 256-261.
41H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 264-272.
42Id.
4397 Cong. Rec. 9340-9349 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 343-352.
44H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 353-356.
4597 Cong. Rec. 9349 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 352.
15The Senate then turned to the prescription drug issue. The Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare held hearings on S. 1186 and H.R. 3298 (as it passed the House) from September
11-13, 1951.46 The Senate Committee recommended the bill favorably, though amending it so as to comport
with the version that passed the House.47 After very little debate, the Senate passed the amended bill on
October 15, 1951.48 The House and Senate agreed on minor diﬀerences at Conference and Public Law 215
of the 82nd Congress, the Durham-Humphrey Amendments, became law on October 26, 1951.49
B.
The Legislative History of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments
1.
The “FDA discretion version”
The original version of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments introduced in the 82nd Congress provided that:
If the drug is intended for use by man and—(1) is a habit-forming drug subject to the
regulations prescribed under section 502(d); or (2) has been found by the Administrator,
after investigation and opportunity for a public hearing, to be unsafe or ineﬀective for use
without the professional diagnosis or supervision of a practitioner licensed by law; or (3) if
an eﬀective application under section 505 limits it to use under the professional supervision
of a practitioner licensed by law, such exemption shall apply only if such drug is dispensed
upon a...prescription....50
Two important features of this version are worth noting. First, instead of creating a mandatory class of
46Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Eighty-
Second Congress, First Session, on S. 1186 and H.R. 3298, Bills to Amend Section 503(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, As Amended [hereinafter “Senate Hearings”], 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at
359-657.
47S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 1 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 664.
4897 Cong. Rec. 13127 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 677.
49Durham-Humphrey Amendments of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 688-689.
16prescription-only drugs, it merely provided an incentive, like the regulations it was replacing, by oﬀering
an exemption from labeling. Second, the ﬁrst category, habit-forming drugs, and the third category, drugs
limited to prescription by their NDAs, of the deﬁnition of prescription drugs were not controversial and
passed into law essentially unchanged. It was the second category, drugs that are unsafe or ineﬀective with-
out professional supervision, that was the focus of the Congressional debate. In this original version of the
bill, the Administrator determined the safety and eﬀectiveness of a drug and was expected to create a list
of those drugs that could be sold only by a prescription.51 Interested parties could petition for addition or
removal from the list, which would force the Administrator to provide notice, allow comment, and hold a
public hearing upon objection, but the ﬁnal decision belonged to the Administrator, though subject to de
novo review in a court of appeals.52
This original version of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments reﬂected the concerns of the pharmacy pro-
fession, which, in conjunction with the FDA, was the driving force behind the legislation.53 Congressman
Durham and Senator Humphrey were both pharmacists and the principal drafters of the bill included two
representatives of major pharmacy associations.54 Thus, as a general matter, the Congressional intent re-
garding this version reﬂected the desires and concerns of this profession. Congressman Durham, in his
statement during the House Hearings, candidly admitted that the legislation was intended for the beneﬁt
of pharmacists, saying, “The purpose of the bill is to eliminate the detrimental confusion that exists at the
present time and that handicaps the profession of pharmacy in its eﬀorts to provide adequate service to the
51See S. 1186, 82nd Cong. 3-4 (1951); H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. 3-4 (1951), both reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at
14-23 (allowing interested parties to petition for drugs to be added or removed from “the list of drugs promulgated by the
Administrator in accordance with clause (2) hereof”); see also House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 19 (1951) (statement of Hon.
Oscar R. Ewing, Administrator, Federal Security Agency), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 47 (“[T]he bill authorizes the
Federal Security Administrator to list, by name, the drugs that are limited to prescription sale.”).
52See S. 1186, 82nd Cong. 3-4 (1951); H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. 3-4 (1951), both reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 14-23.
53See Charles Wesley Dunn, The New Prescription Drug Law, 6 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 951, 963 (1951).
54The principle drafters of the bill were: 1) Herman S. Waller, counsel for the National Association of Retail Druggists; 2)
Roy S. Warnack, a retail druggist active in the California Pharmaceutical Association, a group of retail pharmacists; 3) Charles
Crawford of the FDA; and 4) Congressman Durham. House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 68 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note
32, at 95 (statement of Herman S. Waller, counsel for the National Association of Retail Druggists).
17public.”55 The legislation oﬀered the pharmacists three main beneﬁts. First, it cleared up confusion about
the requirements for prescription reﬁlls caused by a speech by FDA Commissioner Dr. Paul B. Dunbar
to the National Association of Retail Druggists that compared a prescription to a canceled check, thereby
forbidding all reﬁlls of prescriptions, regardless of the safety of the drug.56 The bill permitted reﬁlls of drugs
for which over-the-counter sale was allowed regardless of whether the prescribing physician had consented
and prohibited reﬁlls of drugs restricted by the prescription legend without authorization of the prescriber.57
Second, the bill authorized oral prescriptions and reﬁll orders by doctors, rather than requiring a written
order as under the current FDA interpretation.58 These ﬁrst two features of the bill proved uncontroversial
and were enacted with only minimal discussion.
The third beneﬁt the bill oﬀered pharmacists, however, was the focus of extensive Congressional debate and
is the focus of this legislative history. Beyond reﬁlls and oral prescriptions, the legislation oﬀered pharmacists
“a clear-cut method of distinguishing between ‘prescription drugs’...and ‘over-the-counter drugs’..., and
[required] that drugs be so labeled as to indicate to the retail druggist and to the general public into which
of these two classes they fall.”59 To achieve this, the bill replaced the existing system, where manufacturers
interpreted the FDA regulations and decided whether to label a drug for prescription or OTC use, with a
list of prescription drugs promulgated by the Administrator. The goal was to eliminate the lack of unifor-
mity among manufacturers that plagued the current system and led to confusion and potential liability for
55House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 10 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 38 (statement of Hon. Carl T. Durham, a
Representative in Congress from the State of North Carolina).
56See, e.g., id., at 38; House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 43 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 70 (statement of Roy S.
Warnack, Retail Druggist).
57See House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 11 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 39 (statement of Hon. Carl T. Durham,
a Representative in Congress from the State of North Carolina).
58See, e.g., id., at 38-39; House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 42-43 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 69-70 (statement of
Roy S. Warnack, Retail Druggist) House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 62 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 89 (statement
of Herman S. Waller, Counsel for the National Association of Retail Druggists).
59H.R. Rep. No. 82-700, at 3 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 277.
18pharmacists.60
Although the reasons for the listing provision of the original version are quite clear, it is less obvious what
factors the Administrator was supposed to consider in creating this list. The bill simply said that the Admin-
istrator would decide, after investigation and opportunity for a public hearing, whether a drug was unsafe or
ineﬀective without professional supervision. How the Administrator would make this determination became
a matter of concern at the House Hearings. Congressman Louis B. Heller, Democrat of New York, asked
Oscar Ewing, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, how it would be determined whether or not a
drug could be sold without a prescription. Ewing responded, “It is just a matter of someone’s judgment.”
Congressman Heller then asked, “And whose judgment would that be?,” to which Ewing answered “That
would be the Administrator’s judgment after a hearing and the taking of evidence.”61 Later in the hearings,
Congressman Charles A. Wolverton, Republican of New Jersey, inquired as to how the Administrator would
determine what was a dangerous drug. Ewing responded, “I do not know what you can do but leave it to
the good judgment of someone whom you believe would try to act fairly and honestly on the thing....”62 In
response to continued inquiry from Congressman Wolverton, Ewing said, “[T]he main safeguard you have is
the judgment and fairness of the Administrator....”63 Ewing forthrightly admitted that an Administrator
even could put aspirin on the prescription-only list if he found it to be a dangerous drug at a hearing and the
court of appeals upheld him, which would be likely as long as there was substantial evidence in the record
supporting the Administrator.64
60See id.
61House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 24 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 52 (statement of Hon. Oscar R. Ewing,
Administrator, Federal Security Agency).
62Id. at 66.
63Id.
64Id.
19Thus, in the ﬁrst version of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments, the Rx-OTC decision was within the
full discretion of the Administrator, though subject to de novo review by the court of appeals. Under this
version, the Administrator could consider any factor he chose, both questions of science or medicine and
broad questions of social harm, provided that he could marshal some evidence to support his decision. In
eﬀect, social policy was as equally valid a factor as anything else in the Rx-OTC determination.
It was precisely the broad discretion given to the Administrator in the FDA discretion version that led to its
rejection. Although one powerful lobby, the pharmacists, had written this bill, another powerful lobby, the
pharmaceutical companies, strongly opposed the discretion it gave the Administrator. To the famed food and
drug lawyer Charles Wesley Dunn, representing the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association
at the House Hearings, the problem with the proposed bill was that it substituted “a broad administrative
deﬁnition of a prescription drug for the present objective one.”65 Dunn believed the discretion given to
the Administrator was too vast and would have several negative consequences, including: the conversion of
increasing numbers of old nonprescription drugs into prescription drugs and the resulting increase in medical
costs, the undue interference with the medical profession’s determination of the eﬀectiveness of drugs, and
the increase of bureaucratic control over the drug and medical industries leading to socialized medicine.66
Other representatives of the pharmaceutical industry shared Dunn’s opposition to the bill.67 Although this
opposition did not cause the House Committee to eliminate the Administrator’s role in the Rx-OTC deter-
mination, it did lead them to limit the Administrator’s power in making this decision.68
65House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 80 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 106 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn,
representing American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association).
66Id. at 108-111.
67See, e.g., House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 119 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 145 (statement of Hugo H.
Schaefer, Chairman, Committee on Legislation, American Pharmaceutical Association) (“[The bill] would give the Food and
Drug Administration control over the conduct and policies of drug manufacturers as well as retail pharmacists, vastly beyond
that required for preserving public health, welfare, and safety.”); House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 194 (1951), reprinted in FDA,
supra note 32, at 220 (statement of James F. Hoge, representing the Proprietary Association) (“The power to restrict any
drug to prescription sale would coerce the manufacturer to submit to any labeling demand of the Government which had any
semblance of support. No one can predict, sitting here today, the full extent of this power as it would take form and growth
[sic] with each passing year.”).
68There was also widespread objection to the provision for de novo review by the court of appeals because it was inconsistent
with general standards of review of administrative actions, could raise Constitutional problems by allowing a court to make
202.
Version 2: The “Scientiﬁc Opinion Version”
The House Committee reported H.R. 3298 favorably, but signiﬁcantly amended, to the full House. The
signiﬁcant amendments were to § 503(b), the provision most directly relevant to the Rx-OTC determination.
The amended version read as follows:
A drug intended for use by man which—(A) is a habit-forming drug to which section 502(d)
applies; or (B) because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful eﬀect, or the method
of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, has been determined by the
Administrator, on the basis of opinions generally held among experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc
training and experience to evaluate the safety and eﬃcacy of such drug (and, where a public
hearing is required by paragraph (5), on the basis of evidence adduced at such hearing by
such experts), to be safe and eﬃcacious for use only after professional diagnosis by, or under
the supervision of, a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug; or (C) is limited
by an eﬀective application under section 505 to use under the professional supervision of
a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug, shall be dispensed only...upon
a...prescription.69
Perhaps the most important aspect of the scientiﬁc opinion version is that it introduced a prescription-only
requirement for certain classes of drugs, rather than just creating an incentive for manufacturers to choose
prescription-only status for their drugs. In addition, it abandoned the provision for de novo review in favor of
the normal scope of judicial review provided by other sections of the FD&C Act, de novo review of questions of
law and “substantial evidence” review of factual determinations.70 However, for determining the role of social
harms in the Rx-OTC decision, the provision of note is the added requirement that the Administrator base his
legislative judgments, and would cause problems for the courts of appeals who are not well-suited to hold trials of fact. See,
e.g., Housing Hearings, 82nd Cong. 3 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 31 (report of Federal Security Agency);
Housing Hearings, 82nd Cong. 6 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 34 (report of Justice Department); Housing
Hearings, 82nd Cong. 7-9 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 35-37 (report of Administrative Oﬃce of the United
States Courts); Housing Hearings, 82nd Cong. 209-212 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 235-238 (statement of Hon.
Harold M. Stephens, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia).
70H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 271; H.R. Rep. No. 82-700, at 12 (1951), reprinted in
FDA, supra note 32, at 286.
21Rx-OTC decision on “opinions generally held among experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to
evaluate the safety and eﬃcacy of such drug.” Similarly, while retaining the provision allowing petitioning
by interested parties and requiring a public hearing related to this petition, the revised version added a
requirement that the public hearing be “for the taking of evidence of experts who are qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc
training and experience to testify on the question of whether the drug in question is safe and eﬃcacious for
use only” with professional diagnosis and supervision.71 No longer did the Administrator have unfettered
discretion to consider any factor he chose in making his prescription/nonprescription determination; now,
he had to consider the opinions of scientiﬁc experts.
The reason for this amendment is not diﬃcult to decipher. In fact, the House Report acknowledged that
the addition was meant as a compromise between the positions of the pharmacists (full discretion to the
Administrator) and the pharmaceutical industry (no administrative determination). The Report said, “By
incorporating this standard in the law and by specifying the process to be used by the Administrator in
applying it, the committee believes it has achieved a practical and equitable solution of the dilemma in
which it found itself as a result of the conﬂicting legislative recommendations submitted by the trade and
professional organizations in the drug ﬁeld.”72 The Committee sought to get the uniformity beneﬁts of an
administrative determination desired by the pharmacists while at the same time responding to the objections
of the pharmaceutical industry by limiting the Administrator’s role to “collecting informed medical opinions
and...merely reﬂect[ing] the opinions generally held among medical experts.”73
The true scope of the added language is not necessarily apparent on its face. First, the amendment could
be read as merely requiring the Administrator to consider scientiﬁc opinions as one of many factors in
the Rx-OTC determination. However, the proponents of this version of the bill clearly envisioned that
71H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 271.
72H.R. Rep. No. 82-700, at 11 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 285.
73Id.
22the Administrator would be limited to expert scientiﬁc opinion in making his determination. The House
Report said, “In applying this standard to a given drug, the Administrator is directed to follow the opinions
generally held among experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to evaluate the safety and eﬃcacy
of the drug in question.”74 Furthermore, in the event a hearing was demanded by an interested party, the
House Report said, “At the hearing the evidence taken will be evidence presented by qualiﬁed experts.
The Administrator must base his action, after the hearing, on the testimony given by such experts, not on
his own personal views.”75 Thus, the House Committee, which was the principal drafters of the scientiﬁc
opinion version, believed that they were limiting the Administrator to merely collecting and reﬂecting expert
medical opinions. Other proponents of the bill shared this view, including several Congressmen during the
ﬂoor debate76 and George P. Larrick, the Associate Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration.77
Thus, by giving the Administrator the power to promulgate a list of prescription drugs but limiting him to
considering only expert scientiﬁc opinion, the scientiﬁc opinion version sought to “delegate this authority to
the Administrator and then tie his hands so that he cannot abuse that authority.”78
Second, the text only required the Administrator to base his decision, and take testimony at a hearing,
on scientiﬁc opinion, rather than scientiﬁc evidence. From this, it reasonably could be concluded that the
scientiﬁc experts were free to testify on questions of social harms, as well as scientiﬁc or medical harms,
74Id. (emphasis added).
75Id. (emphasis added).
76See 97 Cong. Rec. 9236 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 316 (statement of Rep. Hugh B. Mitchell, D-WA)
(“The purpose of the hearing would be to receive the testimony of experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience....The
Administrator would be required to base his decision solely on the evidence taken at the hearing....”) (emphasis added);
97 Cong. Rec. 9322 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 325 (statement of Rep. Charles A. Wolverton, R-NJ)
(“Twentieth Question: How is the power of the Administrator circumscribed and how are the rights of interested parties
safeguarded? Answer: The Administrator is called upon to make his determination in accordance with a speciﬁc statutory
standard deﬁning dangerous drugs, and his determination must be based upon generally prevailing opinions of experts with
respect to the safety of such drugs.”) (emphasis added).
77See Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 13, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 377 (statement of George P. Larrick, Deputy
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Food and Drug Administration, Federal Security Agency) (“The ﬁnal decision of the Ad-
ministrator would be required to be based, not on his own personal views but upon the opinions generally held among experts
qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to evaluate the safety and eﬃcacy of the drug when used without professional
guidance.”) (emphasis added).
7897 Cong. Rec. 9333 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 336 (statement of Rep. John Bell Williams, D-MS).
23allowing the FDA to consider social harms that were generally recognized by scientiﬁc experts. However,
the legislative history suggests that Congress wanted to limit the FDA to scientiﬁc opinions on scientiﬁc
evidence. Charles Wesley Dunn, probably the foremost expert on FDA law at the time, clearly thought the
scientiﬁc opinion version limited the FDA to such consideration.79 More importantly, Senator Humphrey, a
sponsor of the bill and a major supporter of the scientiﬁc opinion version, seems to have agreed with Dunn’s
interpretation.80 Commonsense also suggests that Congress would not limit consideration to scientiﬁc opinion
but then allow these opinions to be on topics, including social harms, about which the scientiﬁc experts would
have no special knowledge.81 Thus, Congress almost certainly intended the scientiﬁc opinion version to limit
the Administrator to considering the generally accepted opinions of scientiﬁc experts on questions of science,
not questions of social harm.82
79See Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 106 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 469 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn,
General Counsel, American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association) (“For while it was provided that his deﬁnition must
be supported by scientiﬁc evidence and is subject to court review, he would have no diﬃculty in securing enough scientiﬁc
evidence to support his deﬁnition in each instance despite the existence of other scientiﬁc evidence against it.”) Since Dunn
represented the pharmaceutical industry and was opposed to the scientiﬁc opinion version as giving the Administrator too much
power, it is highly unlikely that he gave this version a narrower reading than was generally accepted in Congress.
80See Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 106 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 469 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn,
General Counsel, American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association):
Senator Humphrey: As I understand it, Mr. Dunn, the administrative regulation which the Food and Drug Administration
has promulgated through the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency has been included in the House bill as a statutory
provision.
Mr. Dunn: With two exceptions. The reference to eﬃcacy was eliminated in the House.
Senator Humphrey: Yes.
Mr. Dunn: And also the reference to the necessity for supporting the classiﬁcation by competent scientiﬁc evidence. Of course,
this reference is implied, because you can’t have a deﬁnition of a prescription drug, unless you have scientiﬁc evidence to support
it.
Senator Humphrey: I would have assumed that.
81It was for the very reason that scientiﬁc experts had no special knowledge of eﬃcacy that some members of Congress
favored removing this term from the deﬁnition. See 97 Cong. Rec. 9335 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 338
(statement of Rep. Fred L. Crawford, R-MI) (“Assuming that a man with great experience and scientiﬁc training did attempt
to say that a drug was eﬃcacious: On what ground can he do that? What scientiﬁc knowledge gives him the ability to say
that a certain drug will cure my cold when my cold might be caused by something he knows nothing about?”). It could be
argued that scientiﬁc experts, being intimately involved in the drug ﬁeld, have special knowledge of the social problems that
arise. However, by this logic, the FDA, as the agency responsible for regulating the drug ﬁeld, would be more appropriate for
making decisions based on social harms.
82See also 97 Cong. Rec. 9236 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 316 (statement of Rep. Hugh B. Mitchell,
D-WA) (“The expert testimony would deal with the question of whether or not the drug could be safely used without medical
supervision including the question of whether or not the drug is one that the layman can use without medical supervision as
an eﬀective weapon against his disease.”) (emphasis added); 97 Cong. Rec. 9322 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32,
at 325 (statement of Rep. Charles A. Wolverton, R-NJ) (“[The Administrator’s] determination must be based upon generally
prevailing opinions of experts with respect to the safety of such drugs.”) (emphasis added).
24Despite these attempts to limit the power of the Administrator, the second version of the Durham-Humphrey
Amendments was ultimately rejected because members of Congress believed that the provision for listing
prescription drugs still gave the Administrator too much power, even if he was limited to considering scientiﬁc
opinion. The pharmaceutical industry was highly skeptical that the scientiﬁc expert requirement would
actually constrain the Administrator. Representatives of both the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’
Association and the Proprietary Association asserted at the Senate Hearings that the Administrator would
be able to ﬁnd experts willing to support any decision he wanted to make.83 Several House Members voiced
this skepticism on the House ﬂoor,84 leading in part to the elimination of this provision in the O’Hara
Amendment.
More important to the rejection of the scientiﬁc opinion version than doubts about the objectiveness of
scientiﬁc experts were doubts about Oscar R. Ewing. Ewing, as Administrator of the Federal Security
Agency, the precursor to the Department of Health and Human Services, was President Truman’s advocate
for national health insurance.85 As such, he was viliﬁed by the medical and pharmaceutical industries
as a proponent of socialized medicine,86 a distrust that is reﬂected in the rejection of this version of the
83See Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 106 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 469 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn,
General Counsel, American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association) (“For while it was provided that his deﬁnition must be
supported by scientiﬁc evidence and is subject to court review, he would have no diﬃculty in securing enough scientiﬁc evidence
to support his deﬁnition in each instance despite the existence of other scientiﬁc evidence against it.”); Senate Hearings, 82nd
Cong. 146 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 509 (statement of Dr. Frederick J. Cullen, Executive Vice President of the
Proprietary Association of Washington, D.C.) (“It comes down to the point that the Administrator could select the particular
experts who hold opinions that suit his purpose in a speciﬁc instance.”) Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 149 (1951), reprinted in
FDA, supra note 32, at 512 (supplemental statement of James F. Hoge, General Counsel, The Proprietary Association) (“The
bill provides that the Administrator make his determination merely upon the basis of opinions of experts—selected, of course,
by him and obtained from writings or ex parte examination.”)
84See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9329 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 332 (statement of Rep. John B. Bennett,
R-MI) (“Everybody knows you can get medical experts to testify on both sides of any question. On the basis of the advice
of his own medical experts, [the Administrator] can take a perfectly harmless drug or a drug that for years has been on the
market and put it on the prescription list.”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9335 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 338 (statement
of Rep. Joseph P. O’Hara, R-MN) (“That means that you are giving to the Administrator the right to call in anybody; and he
determines who is the expert, does he not?”).
85J.R. Fuchs, Oral History Interview with Oscar R. Ewing (May 1, 1969), at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/ewing3.htm.
86Id.; see also 97 Cong. Rec. 9342, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 345 (statement of Rep. Oren Harris, D-AR) (“It
is a rather interesting thing when Oscar Ewing is being used as a whipping boy here. I will say to you if his name was not
involved in this legislation you would not have a leg to stand on, and you know it. You drag out before this Committee the
thing that you think will create the most prejudice against a good piece of legislation.”).
25Amendments. In introducing his amendment to eliminate the role of the Administrator in the Rx-OTC
decision, Congressman Joseph P. O’Hara, Republican of Minnesota, said, “What is being attempted here is
to give this terriﬁc amount of power to Oscar Ewing and the Food and Drug Administration to bring about
a complete change in the entire picture in this country. Let me say to you, and I say it in all seriousness,
that this bill, at least as it is now written, is the handmaiden of socialized medicine.”87 Other Congressmen
who supported the O’Hara Amendment concurred in these doubts about giving so much power to a person
they saw as favoring socialized medicine.88 Thus, the House Committee’s version of the bill was rejected
because it was seen as giving too much power to the Federal Security Administrator, a man not trusted by
the members of Congress.89
3.
Version 3: The “Enacted Version”
8797 Cong. Rec. 9341 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 344 (statement of Rep. Joseph P. O’Hara, R-MN).
88See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9237, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 317 (statement of Rep. Leo Elwood Allen, R-IL)
(“If this bill is not amended, Oscar Ewing will have the power under this bill to determine what drugs will be sold; and, if
they are permitted to be sold, whether or not they will be sold over the counter or upon prescriptions. This is the same
Oscar Ewing who is the original sponsor of socialized medicine....”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9325, reprinted in FDA, supra note
32, at 328 (statement of Rep. John V. Beamer, R-IN) (“Some more of the socialistic schemes are introduced in this manner
by incorporating worthwhile legislation which we want to support with objectionable sections which we must oppose.”); 97
Cong. Rec. 9326, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 329 (statement of Rep. Paul W. Shafer, R-MI) (“[T]his provision may
easily become the handmaiden to socialized medicine....[T]his provision gives the Federal Security Administrator opportunity
increasingly to restrict the over-the-counter sale of drugs, thereby increasing cost of medication and creating one more artiﬁcial
stimulus to the demand for socialized medicine.”) 97 Cong. Rec. 9327, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 330 (statement of
Rep. Clarence J. Brown, R-OH) (seeking an amendment that would give the pharmacists want they wanted but would “protect
the medical profession from the threat of socialized medicine.”).
89See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9237, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 317 (statement of Rep. Leo Elwood Allen, R-IL) (“All
opposition to this bill centers around the extraordinary powers proposed to be granted to Federal Security Administrator Oscar
Ewing.”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9326, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 329 (statement of Rep. Paul W. Shafer, R-MI) (“By
conferring authority to determine the category in which each of some 30,000 drugs would be placed, we bestow on FSA, on Mr.
Oscar Ewing, and on his successors as Federal Security Administrator, the power to legislate by directive.”); 97 Cong. Rec.
9327, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 330 (statement of Rep. Joseph P. O’Hara, R-MN) (“I intend to oﬀer an amendment
which will strike out the objectionable features of this bill, namely, amending B and striking out subsection 5. That will remove
this tremendous grant of administrative absolutism to Mr. Ewing as the Food and Drug Administrator, and I am sure a great
many Members and many, many of the people of this country do not want him to have such power.”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9333,
reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 336 (statement of Rep. George Meader, R-MI) (describing the House Committee version
as “giving dictatorial power to the Federal Security Administrator”); see also S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 4 (1951), reprinted in
FDA, supra note 32, at 667 (“The grant of such administrative authority was objected to as an unnecessary regulation of the
drug industry, and the committee concluded that administrative listing was not necessary at this time.”).
26The amendment suggested by Congressman O’Hara, and endorsed by the Senate Committee, was ultimately
enacted into law as the Durham-Humphrey Amendments. Members of Congress viewed this version as re-
moving the Rx-OTC determination from the control of the Administrator, though this was perhaps erroneous
given the FDA’s role in the approval of NDAs.90 Instead, it provided a statutory standard based on the
then-existing FDA regulations, requiring a drug to be dispensed only by a prescription if, “because of its
toxicity or other potentiality for harmful eﬀect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary
to its use, [it] is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer
such drug.”91 The manufacturer would apply the statutory standard to determine whether a drug must be
sold by a prescription only, subject to the possibility of an enforcement action by the FDA. The reason for
this change was explored above and was principally a result of Congressional concern about giving too much
power to Federal Security Administrator Oscar Ewing.
If the FDA discretion version of the bill reﬂected the desires and concerns of the pharmacy profession,
the deﬁnition contained in the enacted version codiﬁed the desires and concerns of the pharmaceutical
90The enacted version did not completely remove the FDA from the initial decision since a drug could still be limited to
prescription-only status in its NDA. According to FDA Deputy Commissioner George P. Larrick, the FDA could require a NDA
to limit a drug to prescription-only status and often did so; this was frequently with the cooperation of the manufacturer but
the FDA could require it over the objection of a manufacturer after a formal hearing and the opportunity for judicial review.
See Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 14-16 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 378-380 (statement of George P. Larrick,
Deputy Commissioner of FDA). Despite the fact that the Durham-Humphrey Amendments explicitly preserved this role in
the third prong of the prescription drug deﬁnition, members of Congress saw the move to the enacted version as leaving the
initial decision to the manufacturer with the FDA limited to bringing enforcement actions if it disagreed with the decision.
See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9341 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 344 (statement of Rep. Joseph P. O’Hara, R-MN)
(noting that if diﬀerent manufacturers took diﬀerent views on whether a drug was prescription-only, the FDA could bring suit
for mislabeling); 97 Cong. Rec. 9342 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 345 (statement of Rep. Oren Harris, D-AR)
(“You will leave to the authority of the commercial drug interests in this country to decide what is best for the American people
and the health and welfare of the people.”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9345 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 348 (statement
of Rep. John Bell Williams, D-MS) (noting that the scientiﬁc opinion version would allow the Administrator to decide if a drug
should be prescription-only but if the O’Hara Amendment was adopted, the manufacturer would do so); 97 Cong. Rec. 9347
(1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 350 (statement of Rep. Charles J. Kersten, R-WI) (favoring “the present system”
where the Administrator did not decide what drugs must be prescription-only). The reason for this apparently erroneous view
is unclear, but it likely had to do with Congressional misunderstanding about the role of the FDA in the NDA process or the
belief that very few drugs would be limited to prescription-only status by their NDAs.
91H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 658-661.
27industry.92 Its ultimate acceptance resulted from a compromise between the pharmacy profession and the
pharmaceutical industry reached during the Senate Hearings.93 In exchange for the support of the pharmacy
profession for their favored deﬁnition of a prescription drug, the pharmaceutical industry agreed to support
two amendments favored by the pharmacists. The ﬁrst narrowed the prohibition on improper labeling
of nonprescription drugs with the prescription legend, and the second gave pharmacists who relied on a
manufacturer’s insuﬃcient labeling a good faith defense from liability.94 In light of this compromise, the
Senate Committee recommended the House version of the bill with the suggested amendments and this
version passed the Senate on October 15, 1951. The House agreed to the proposed amendments and the bill
became law on October 26, 1951.
The enacted version of the bill essentially codiﬁed the 1944 FDA regulations.95 The only major diﬀerence
was that the bill only limited drugs that were unsafe without professional supervision to prescription-only
status, whereas the regulations limited drugs that were unsafe or ineﬀective. However, the Senate Committee
suggested that this was only a limited change, saying that it was “not intended to mean that the only matter
to be considered in applying the deﬁnition is whether or not a particular drug is poisonous.”96
III.
92See Dunn, supra note 53, at 963. In fact, the enacted version almost perfectly mirrored the suggestions of Charles
Wesley Dunn in his testimony before the House Committee. Compare House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 79-85 (1951), reprinted in
FDA, supra note 32, at 105-111 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn, representing American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’
Association) with H.R. 3298, 82nd Cong. (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 658-661; see also Dunn, supra, at 955
(noting that ﬁnal bill enacted Dunn’s suggestions).
93See S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 2-3 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 665-666 (noting Senate Committee favored
deﬁnition of House bill because of agreement between National Association of Retail Druggists, the American Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers’ Association, the American Drug Manufacturers Association, and the Proprietary Association, which was not
opposed by the Federal Security Agency).
94Id. at 7.
95See id. at 4 (“It is substantially the same as the administrative deﬁnition now contained in the regulations issued by the
Federal Security Administrator under the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9318
(1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 351 (statement of Rep. John B. Bennett, R-MI) (“[T]he eﬀect of the O’Hara
amendment is relatively simple. What it does is to legalize the regulations under which the Food and Drug Administration has
been operating in this ﬁeld for a period of years.”).
96S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 4 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 667.
28A.
Implications of Congressional Objectives for Consideration of Social Harms in the Rx-
OTC Determination
Congress was presented with two relatively stark choices regarding social harms during the Durham-Humphrey
Amendment process. The ﬁrst version of the bill gave the Administrator complete discretion to make the de-
cision, 97 allowing for full consideration of both scientiﬁc/medical harms and social harms, while the second
version of the bill expressly limited the Administrator to consideration only of expert scientiﬁc testimony,
thereby eliminating social harms as a valid consideration.98 Unfortunately for purposes of determining the
proper role of social harms, Congress chose neither of these alternatives, enacting instead a more ambiguous
version. Although it could be argued that the rejection of the scientiﬁc opinion version on the House ﬂoor
and in the Senate Committee reveals a Congressional intent for consideration of more than just science,
this would misrepresent the legislative history. Congress rejected the scientiﬁc opinion version not because
it thought that the decision-making was too constrained by this limitation but instead because it thought
that the decision-making was not suﬃciently constrained. Four broad Congressional goals motivated the
move from earlier deﬁnitions of a prescription drug to that in the enacted version: to restrain the power
of the Administrator, to enact the “objective” deﬁnition of the 1944 regulations, to preserve the right to
self-medication, and to eliminate reference to the eﬃcacy of a drug. Although there is no direct evidence in
the legislative history as to whether or not Congress considered social harms to be an appropriate consider-
ation for the Rx-OTC decision, each of these goals indirectly suggests that Congress intended the Rx-OTC
determination to be limited to scientiﬁc considerations.
97See Section IIB, Part 1, supra.
98See Section IIB, Part 2, supra. Admittedly, the scientiﬁc opinion version on its face only limited the FDA to considering
scientiﬁc opinion and did not address what the content of this opinion could be. However, the legislative history persuasively
suggests that Congress intended to limit the FDA to consideration of expert scientiﬁc opinion on scientiﬁc evidence. See id.
291.
Restraining the Power of the Administrator
The legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments is a story of increasing restrictions on the
power of the Administrator in the Rx-OTC determination. In the FDA discretion version, the Administrator
was given full power and discretion over the decision. In the scientiﬁc opinion version, he was given the power
to make the ultimate determination but had to base this determination solely on opinions generally held by
scientiﬁc experts. Finally, in the enacted version, members of Congress intended the Administrator to have
no role in the initial Rx-OTC determination and merely be able to bring enforcement actions if he disagreed
with the manufacturer’s classiﬁcation. In light of these increasing restrictions and the opposition expressed
by members of Congress to the Administrator and the power proposed to be given him in earlier versions of
the bill,99 it is clear that Congress wanted to give the Administrator as little power and discretion as possible.
For that reason, it seems highly doubtful that Congress intended the FDA to consider broad questions of
social harm. Such questions are inherently subjective, provide room for the exercise of discretion, and are
not much narrower than the “judgment of the Administrator” standard rejected in the FDA discretion
version. Thus, the very concerns that motivated Congress to reject both the FDA discretion version and the
scientiﬁc opinion version—distrust of the Administrator and concern about giving him too much power and
discretion—suggest that Congress did not view social harm as an acceptable consideration for the Rx-OTC
determination.
That Congress permitted the provision allowing drugs to be limited to Rx-status in their NDAs to pass into
law unchanged is an anomaly. This provision allowed the FDA to apply the statutory standard and limit a
99See Section IIB, part 2, supra.
30drug to prescription-only status over the objection of the manufacturer by objecting to its OTC labeling.100
This permitted the FDA to do at the NDA stage what it could not do once the drug was on the market and
contradicts the expressed Congressional goal of limiting the Administrator’s power. Although it is possible
that Congress was only concerned about the power of the Administrator over existing drugs and accepted
his broad power over new drugs, the vehement opposition to giving power to the Administrator suggests
otherwise.101 In fact, members of Congress were quite clear that they did not believe it was proper for
the Administrator, or presumably the FDA, to decide whether a drug should be prescription-only,102 which
is essentially what would be allowed under the NDA provision. Perhaps acceptance of the NDA provision
reﬂected a compromise between those favoring limited FDA powers and those favoring broad FDA powers,
but this is highly unlikely given the lack of any evidence about such a compromise in the legislative history
or even any discussion of this provision. Thus, the best conclusion that can be drawn is that the broad power
the NDA provision gave the FDA was an oversight by Congress, either because they did not understand the
FDA’s role in the NDA process or did not understand that many drugs would be restricted to prescription-
only status by their NDAs.
If Congress had anticipated a system where the FDA actually was making the primary Rx-OTC decision, it
certainly would have wanted to limit its power and discretion. Limiting the Administrator to collecting and
100See Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 14-16 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 378-380 (statement of George P.
Larrick, Deputy Commissioner of FDA).
101See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9327, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 330 (statement of Rep. Joseph P. O’Hara, R-MN) (“I
intend to oﬀer an amendment....[t]hat will remove this tremendous grant of administrative absolutism to Mr. Ewing as the
Food and Drug Administrator, and I am sure a great many Members and many, many of the people of this country do not want
him to have such power.”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9333, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 336 (statement of Rep. George Meader,
R-MI) (describing the House Committee version as “giving dictatorial power to the Federal Security Administrator”); see also
S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 4 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 667 (“The grant of such administrative authority was
objected to as an unnecessary regulation of the drug industry, and the committee concluded that administrative listing was not
necessary at this time.”).
102See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9237, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 317 (statement of Rep. Leo Elwood Allen, R-IL) (“If
this bill is not amended, Oscar Ewing will have the power under this bill to determine what drugs will be sold; and, if they
are permitted to be sold, whether or not they will be sold over the counter or upon prescriptions....”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9326,
reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 329 (statement of Rep. Paul W. Shafer, R-MI) (“By conferring authority to determine the
category in which each of some 30,000 drugs would be placed, we bestow on FSA, on Mr. Oscar Ewing, and on his successors
as Federal Security Administrator, the power to legislate by directive.”).
31reﬂecting the generally accepted medical and scientiﬁc opinions of experts is an eﬀective way to “delegate
this authority to the Administrator and then tie his hands so that he cannot abuse that authority.”103 This
approach, basically that of the scientiﬁc opinion version, was rejected on the House ﬂoor and in the Senate
Committee as insuﬃciently restraining the Administrator’s power.104 However, knowing that it could not
have its ideal solution of eliminating the role of the Administrator in the initial determination, Congress
likely would have accepted limiting the Administrator to consideration of generally accepted scientiﬁc and
medical harms as the second best way to achieve their foremost objective in choosing a deﬁnition of a pre-
scription drug—limiting the power of the FDA.
2.
Enacting the “Objective” Deﬁnition of the 1944 Regulations
In lobbying in opposition to the ﬁrst two versions of the bill, the pharmaceutical industry argued that they
improperly substituted an “administrative deﬁnition” of prescription drugs, a deﬁnition dependent on action
by the FDA, for the self-applying “objective deﬁnition” contained in the 1944 regulations.105 This lobbying
clearly worked, as both House members supporting the O’Hara Amendment106 and the Senate Committee107
saw the move from the scientiﬁc opinion version to the enacted version as codifying the 1944 regulations. To
10397 Cong. Rec. 9333 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 336 (statement of Rep. John Bell Williams, D-MS).
104See Part IIB, Section 2.
105See, e.g., House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 80, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 106 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn,
representing American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association) (“The objection is that it substitutes a broad administrative
deﬁnition of a prescription drug for the present objective one....”); id. at 107 (“This basic deﬁnition of a prescription drug
[contained in the 1944 regulations] is clearly an appropriate and sound one; and consequently it is unnecessary to substitute
another.”).
106See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9348, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 351 (statement of Rep. John B. Bennett, R-MI)
(“[T]he eﬀect of the O’Hara amendment is relatively simple. What it does is to legalize the regulations under which the Food
and Drug Administration has been operating in this ﬁeld for a period of years.”)
107S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 4 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 667 (“It is substantially the same as the administrative
deﬁnition now contained in the regulations issued by the Federal Security Administrator under the provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”)
32the extent that this deﬁnition was actually “objective” as claimed by the pharmaceutical industry, it would
seem to preclude consideration of social harms, since social issues are inherently subjective. Obviously,
the deﬁnition of a prescription drug contained in the regulations, and adopted by the Durham-Humphrey
Amendments is not facially objective; neither “other potentialities for harmful eﬀect” nor “collateral measures
necessary to its use” are clear and both leave plenty of room for reasonable minds to disagree.108 However,
since the basic purpose of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments was to eliminate confusion and inconsistency
that plagued the pharmacy profession,109 Congress likely wanted to limit manufacturers to consideration of
the generally accepted scientiﬁc and medical opinions of experts in applying the deﬁnition of a prescription
drug. If consideration of social harms were allowed, the Rx-OTC determinations of diﬀerent manufacturers
would likely diﬀer for the same or similar products based on diﬀering views of social policy. This was the
exact situation that motivated introduction of the Durham-Humphrey bill in the ﬁrst place. On the other
hand, manufacturers are much more likely to have the same view as to the generally accepted opinions of
experts on scientiﬁc and medical issues. Thus, while limiting consideration to scientiﬁc questions would not
achieve the perfect consistency desired by the pharmacy profession, it would come a lot closer than allowing
consideration of social harms and as a result better represents Congressional intent.
Furthermore, the repeated reference in the legislative history to enacting the 1944 regulations into statute
supports the view that only science, and not social policy, was to be considered in making the Rx-OTC deter-
mination. The 1944 regulations provided that a drug was exempted from the relevant labeling requirements
if:
108The meaning of the terms of the deﬁnition and their role in determining whether social harms are appropriate Rx-OTC
switch considerations is considered in more detail infra, Part IIIB.
109See Part IIB, Section 1.
33Such drug or device, because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful eﬀect or the
method of its use or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not generally recognized
among experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to evaluate its safety and eﬃ-
cacy, as safe and eﬃcacious for use except by or under the supervision of a physician....110
The reference in the regulations to scientiﬁc experts limited the decision to scientiﬁc and medical evidence.111
Thus, by seeking to enact these regulations into statute, Congress seemed to endorse a science-only determi-
nation. Although elimination of the reference to scientiﬁc experts when the 1944 regulations were codiﬁed
in 1951 could be seen as broadening the permissible considerations, two factors suggest otherwise. First,
there is no suggestion by any member of Congress of an intent to depart from the science-only deﬁnition of
the 1944 regulations and, to the contrary, there is a plethora of explicit statements of a desire to enact the
1944 regulations into statute. Second, such a reading would conﬂict with the eﬀorts of the pharmaceutical
companies to achieve an objective deﬁnition discussed in the preceding paragraph. Since the deﬁnition in
the enacted version reﬂected exactly what Charles Wesley Dunn had advocated for on behalf of the pharma-
ceutical industry,112 it is implausible that Congress would deviate from the desires of this industry only on
the limitation to scientiﬁc experts issue without there being some mention of this in the legislative record.
Instead, the exclusion of this language is probably better explained by a desire to distinguish the proposed
O’Hara amendment from the scientiﬁc opinion version that was being considered at the time, which con-
tained references to the opinions of scientiﬁc experts. Exclusion of the reference to scientiﬁc experts may also
be explained by Congressional acceptance of Dunn’s argument that the deﬁnition was inherently limited to
scientiﬁc considerations regardless of reference to scientiﬁc opinions. Dunn told the House Committee, “For
the existing deﬁnition [the regulatory deﬁnition] is a generic and scientiﬁc one, which is fully protective in
the circumstances...”113 and told the Senate Committee, “[T]his reference [to requiring scientiﬁc evidence
111On its face, the regulation does not prevent these experts from opining on social issues. However, as discussed supra, it is
likely that when the FDA and Congress referred to reliance on scientiﬁc experts, they intended this to mean reliance on the
scientiﬁc opinions of scientiﬁc experts. See supra, Part IIIA, Section 2.
112See House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 79-85 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 105-111 (statement of Charles Wesley
Dunn, representing American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association).
113House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 81 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 107 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn,
34to support classiﬁcation] is implied, because you can’t make a deﬁnition of prescription drug, unless you
have scientiﬁc evidence.”114
The deﬁnition of a prescription drug that was ultimately enacted into law reﬂected the desires of the pharma-
ceutical industry and their supporters in Congress to enact the “objective” deﬁnition of the 1944 regulations,
rather than the administrative deﬁnition proposed in earlier versions. The best conclusion that can be drawn
from this successful eﬀort is that Congress intended to limit the Rx-OTC decision to considerations of sci-
entiﬁc expert evidence.
3.
Preserving the Right of Self-Medication
Commentators agree that the Durham-Humphrey Amendments, like the 1938 FD&C Act, sought to protect
and improve the right to self-medication by not unduly restricting access to any safe nonprescription drug.115
This view is well supported by the legislative record. Trying to assuage fears of House members regarding
the FDA discretion version, FDA Associate Commissioner Larrick said, “Our thinking is that considering
the legislative history of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the many references in this statute to the
fact that the Congress does not wish to outlaw self-medication, but does want to make self-medication safe
and eﬀective, that we, in making this list, should always bear in mind that the Congress has instructed us
not to unnecessarily restrict self-medication.”116 Similarly, in his mock question and answer on the House
representing American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association).
114Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 110 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 473 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn,
General Counsel, American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association). That members of Congress agreed with Mr. Dunn’s
interpretation is revealed by Senator Humphrey’s response to Mr. Dunn’s assertion that the enacted deﬁnition implicitly limited
consideration to scientiﬁc evidence. Senator Humphrey said, “I would have assumed that.” Id.
115See Hutt, supra note 10, at 432; see also United States v. An Article of Drug...“Decholin,” 264 F. Supp. 473, 478 (E.D.
Mich. 1967).
116Housing Hearings, 82nd Cong. 110 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 136 (statement of George P. Larrick,
Associate Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Food and Drug Administration, Federal Security Agency).
35ﬂoor, Congressman Wolverton assured House members that the scientiﬁc opinion version would improve,
not undermine, self-medication.117 Finally, those advocating the enacted version claimed that it did a
better job of protecting the right of self-medication than the prior versions.118 While there may not have
been agreement as to which version of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments was best, there was general
agreement that the right to self-medication should be protected and improved.
This Congressional goal is reinforced by the oft-asserted desire to enact the 1944 regulations into statute.119
Some leading commentators have suggested that the post-1938 regulations by the FDA reﬂected a break
with the Congressional desire to preserve self-medication.120 Although this may be true of the initial reg-
ulations issued in 1938, the 1944 regulations actually represented a move in favor of self-medication. The
motivation for those changes was a concern that manufacturers were unnecessarily labeling safe drugs for
prescription-only sale.121 The FDA’s real concern was probably that drugs were being sold with neither
labeling for self-use nor a prescription, but the eﬀect of the 1944 changes was to promote self-medication by
insuring that all drugs generally recognized as safe and eﬀective for self-medication were available. Thus, to
the extent that Congress sought to enact the 1944 regulations into law, it enacted a deﬁnition that promoted
safe self-medication.
11797 Cong. Rec. 9323 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 326 (statement of Rep. Charles A. Wolverton, R-NJ)
(“Thirty-fourth question: Does the bill restrict the public’s choice of remedies? Answer: No. It guarantees that all drugs
that can be safely used by a layman shall be labeled with complete directions which the purchaser can follow without medical
advice. It does prevent the sale without a prescription of drugs that would harm the purchaser if he took them without
professional advice. It is distinctly advantageous to the public.”). The minority report of the House Committee disagreed with
this assessment, claiming that “there is no doubt that the bill as reported jeopardizes the traditional right of self-medication and
choice of remedies.” H.R. Rep. No. 82-700, at 31 (Minority Report), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 305. The minority
believed that taking the decision away from the Administrator—which is what eventually occurred—would better protect the
right of self-medication.
118See, e.g., Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 140 (1951) (statement of Dr. Frederick J. Cullen, Executive Vice President of the
Proprietary Association of Washington, D.C.) (“If [the scientiﬁc opinion version] is enacted in its present form...[w]e are sure
that in a very short time many of the products that are now being used in self-medication will be placed upon the prescription
list, and as the years go on the list of drugs that may be used for self-medication will be reduced until proprietary remedies will
practically disappear from the market.”)
119See supra, Part IIIA, Section 2.
120See Temin, supra note 8, at 53-55; Williams, supra note 30, at 164-167.
121See supra, Part IIA, Section 1.
36Although the Congressional desire to promote self-medication is itself a decision of social policy, it actually
supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend social harms to be part of the Rx-OTC determi-
nation. When Congress was legislating in 1951, as in 1938, it made the social policy decision that most
non-narcotic drugs should be available to consumers without a prescription. The only change between 1938
and 1951 was the addition of a relatively narrow exception for those drugs that were not safe and eﬀective
for self-medication. In the Durham-Humphrey Amendments, Congress construed this exception even more
narrowly by eliminating reference to eﬀectiveness.122 Thus, in creating a class of mandatory prescription
drugs, Congress made a determination of social policy that access to drugs should only be restricted when
absolutely necessary: when the drug was unsafe, due to actual harmful consequences, for self-medication.123
With the exception of these harmful drugs, Congress implicitly determined that consumers themselves, and
the market as a whole, should weigh other considerations—e.g. price, morality, social harms, etc.—and
determine whether the beneﬁts of the drug outweighed its downsides. Consideration of social harms in the
Rx-OTC decision would allow the FDA, rather than consumers and the market, to weigh the beneﬁts of
drugs against their social harms and would prevent consumer access to drugs that would not directly harm
them. Thus, FDA consideration of social issues would exceed the authority given to the FDA in 1951 because
Congress had already determined that self-medication outweighed any other factors, including social harms,
that did not pose an immediate risk to the safety of the consumer.
4.
Eliminating Reference to Eﬀectiveness
122See infra, Part IIIA, Section 4.
123See United States v. An Article of Drug...“Decholin,” 264 F. Supp. 473, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1967) ([“I]t seems that the
Government, in order to prevail in this case, must establish that Decholin has a potentiality for causing consequences for an
unadvised layman which can actually be called harmful; for in common usage the term ‘safe’ is not inapplicable to an article
merely because the product may give rise to some eﬀects which are uncomfortable or cause some inconvenience.”); see also
infra, Part IIIB, Section 3.
37The only change in the Durham-Humphrey Amendments from the 1944 deﬁnition that Congress considered
important was elimination of the reference to eﬀectiveness.124 Under the 1944 regulations, a drug was
appropriate for prescription-only status if it was “safe and eﬃcacious for use under the supervision of a
physician,”125 whereas the Durham-Humphrey Amendments limited prescription drugs to those “not safe
for use except under the supervision of a” licensed practitioner.126 Although limitation of the deﬁnition to
unsafe drugs was not meant to suggest that the only relevant consideration was the inherent toxicity of a
drug,127 it was meant to narrow the allowable considerations in making the Rx-OTC decision.128 Proponents
of the elimination of eﬃcacy saw it as promoting, at least in part, the Congressional goals of restraining the
power of the Administrator,129 enacting the “objective” deﬁnition of the 1944 regulations,130 and promoting
the right to self-medication.131
124See S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 4, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 667; see also Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 110 (1951),
reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 473 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn, General Counsel, American Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers’ Association).
1259 Fed. Reg. 12255 (1944).
126Durham-Humphrey Amendments of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-215, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 688.
127See S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 4, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 667.
128See, e.g. H.R. Rep. No. 82-700, at 30 (“Minority Report”), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 304 (favoring elimination
of eﬃcacy because “[t]his control [by the Administrator] is widened by the use of the words ‘eﬃcacy’ and ‘eﬃcacious”’); 97
Cong. Rec. 9334 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 337 (statement of Rep. Kenneth A. Roberts, D-AL) (proposing
amendment on House ﬂoor, as member of the House Committee who supported the scientiﬁc opinion version, to eliminate
reference to eﬃcacy as being “too broad”).
129See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9334 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 337 (statement of Rep. John Bell Williams,
D-MS) (“I feel that this amendment [removing reference to eﬃcacy] eliminates the dangers which are anticipated in this
bill by the gentleman from Minnesota [Congressman O’Hara], that is, the granting to the Federal Security Administrator of
improper or unwarranted authority.”); 97 Cong. Rec. 9335 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 338 (statement of
Rep. John B. Bennett, R-MI) (supporting elimination of eﬃcacy “because it gives too much authority to the Federal Security
Administrator.”).
130See, e.g., 97 Cong. Rec. 9335 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 338 (statement of Rep. Fred L. Crawford,
R-MI) (“Assuming that a man with great experience and scientiﬁc training did attempt to say that a drug was eﬃcacious: On
what ground can he do that? What scientiﬁc knowledge gives him the ability to say that a certain drug will cure my cold when
my cold might be caused by something he knows nothing about?”); see also House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 163 (1951), reprinted
in FDA, supra note 32, at 189 (statement of Leslie D. Harrop, General Counsel, American Drug Manufacturers Association)
(“When you talk about eﬃcacy, there are bound to be diﬀerences [among scientiﬁc experts]. You can get the ﬁnest experts in
the country, and half of them will line up on one side and half on the other side.”).
131See, e.g. House Hearings, 82nd Cong. 194 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 220 (statement of James F.
Hoge, representing the Proprietary Association) (“[T]he inclusion of the word ‘ineﬀective’....jeopardizes the traditional right
of self-medication and choice of remedies.”); Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 140 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 503
(statement of Dr. Frederick J. Cullen, Executive Vice President of the Proprietary Association of Washington, D.C.) (“But
eﬃcacy is based upon opinion, and to include the word “eﬃcacious” in a law such as this world [sic—would] be to open the
door to an almost unlimited control of therapeutics. The Administrator could jeopardize the traditional right of self-medication
and the choice of remedies for minor ills.”)
38The elimination of reference to eﬃcacy is not directly related to the consideration of social harms. However,
through this action, Congress sought to narrow the permissible issues in the Rx-OTC switch as much as
possible, a goal that conﬂicts with the consideration of social harms, which are far broader and less deﬁnite
a criteria than eﬀectiveness.
B.
Relationship Between the Speciﬁc Provisions of the Deﬁnition and the Consideration
of Social Harms in Making the Rx-OTC Determination
Having concluded from the broad Congressional objectives behind the Durham-Humphrey Amendments’
choice of deﬁnition that social harms were not intended considerations in the Rx-OTC decision, the speciﬁc
provisions of the deﬁnition must still be considered to determine whether they shed any light on the role of
social harms. Although the legislative record is sparse as to any discussion of the meaning of these terms, it is
quite clear that the only terms that leave room for consideration of social policy are “other potentialities for
harmful eﬀect” and “collateral measures necessary to its use.” However, the appropriateness of considering
of social policy under these terms is questionable, especially given the requirement that any consideration
aﬀect the safety of the drug.
1.
Toxicity/Method of Use
There is general agreement that neither toxicity nor method of use allow for consideration of social harms.
39Toxicity, as used in this provision, has been variously deﬁned to mean “poisonous”;132 to mean “the state
of being a potential source of harm for any reason directly attributable to its ingredients”;133 and to mean
“[d]rugs that have a low margin of safety, and which must therefore be titrated carefully to achieve an
adequate level of eﬀectiveness without endangering patient safety.”134 Furthermore, toxicity was the only
one of the four prongs of the deﬁnition explained in the legislative record. In testimony before the Senate
Committee, Charles Wesley Dunn, perhaps the chief proponent of the enacted deﬁnition, said, “Now [toxicity]
is a purely scientiﬁc question, which is ﬁrst decided in the laboratory, and secondly, is determined by clinical
experience on a control basis.”135 Given the purely scientiﬁc nature of the toxicity inquiry, it allows no room
for social harms.
Unlike toxicity, the legislative record is bare as to the meaning of “method of use.” However, by its text,
this prong seems to refer to how the drug is administered (e.g. orally, by injection, etc.) and to limit consid-
eration to whether a doctor is needed to supervise administration of the drug and to monitor the patient’s
progress on the drug.136
2.
Other Potentialities for Harmful Eﬀect/Collateral Measures Necessary to Its Use
Discussion of the meaning of “other potentialities for harmful eﬀect” is lacking in the legislative record, and
132See 97 Cong. Rec. 9335 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 338 (statement of Rep. Oren Harris, D-AR) (equating
toxic to poisonous).
133United States v. An Article of Drug...“Decholin,” 264 F. Supp. 473, 476 n. 2 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
134Hutt, supra note 10, at 433.
135Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 112 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 475 (statement of Charles Wesley Dunn,
General Counsel, American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association).
136See Hutt, supra note 10, at 437. Hutt questions the importance of this factor today given that most drugs can be self-
administered; for example, insulin is administered by injection but is available without a prescription. Id.
40its textual meaning is unclear. It could be argued that the toxicity prong was meant to cover scientiﬁc and
medical harms and that the “other potentialities” prong was meant to cover all other types of harm, including
social harms. On the other hand, the prong’s textual juxtaposition next to “toxicity”137 and the fact that
none of the deﬁnitions of toxicity cover all possible scientiﬁc or medical harms could mean that “other
potentialities” was meant to cover those scientiﬁc or medical harms not included within the chosen deﬁnition
of toxicity (i.e. those that do not result directly from the drug’s ingredients). One court considering this
provision concluded that it was broader than toxicity but still limited to concerns regarding human health.138
A leading commentator has implicitly endorsed this view. He read this phrase to include potential for abuse,
serious or common harmful eﬀects from interaction with other products, and the development of a harmful
tolerance,139 all of which can be viewed as medical or scientiﬁc harms because of their eﬀects on the human
body.140 On the other hand, he argued that this provision did not include the potential for tampering with
OTC products or the possibility for use as an ingredient in creating narcotics,141 both of which are more
akin to social harms because they relate to human behavior.
Likewise, there is a complete dearth of Congressional discussion of the phrase “collateral measures necessary
to use” and its textual meaning is also far from clear. The ambiguity and potential breadth of this term has
led one leading commentator to argue persuasively that this provision was intended “to have the broadest
137The use of “and” between “toxicity” and “other potentialities for harmful eﬀect” seems to suggest that these form a single
prong of a three-prong deﬁnition (rather than two parts of a four-prong deﬁnition). Though often considered separately, this
textual reading provides support for the assertion that “other potentialities for harmful eﬀect” is limited to scientiﬁc and medical
considerations in the same way as toxicity.
138National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger, 366 F.Supp. 1341, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“It is plain that the concern
over ‘potentiality for harmful eﬀect’ imposes broad responsibility on the Commissioner to safeguard human health.”), aﬀ’d by
491 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1973). The court, consistent with the interpretation of Hutt, see infra note 118, concluded that it was
appropriate for the FDA to limit sale of a vitamin to a prescription based on concerns that people would use excessive dosages.
See National Nutritional Foods Ass’n, supra.
139Hutt, supra note 10, at 435.
140Admittedly, the potential for abuse could be viewed as a social harm. However, the commentator seems to be referring to
the addictiveness of the drug, for he says that a drug listed under the Controlled Substances Act would be denied OTC status
under this provision. Id. Addictiveness relates to the drug’s eﬀect on the body and is therefore a scientiﬁc consideration.
141See id. at 436.
41possible scope” and to “encompass[] all aspects of the circumstances under which a drug is used, including
broad questions of social policy,” such as issues of morality, the need to have cheap and easily available
drugs, the cost of medical care, protection of the medical and pharmacy professions, and the proﬁtability
(and consequential incentive to research) of the pharmaceutical industry.142 Though perhaps not going as far
as the distinguished commentator, one court considering the deﬁnition in detail also gave a relatively broad
reading to “collateral measures necessary to its use.” Rejecting the assertion that Congress’ elimination of
express reference to eﬀectiveness prevented it from being considered under this prong, the court said that
the ineﬀectiveness of a drug could be considered under the collateral measures heading to the extent that it
made the drug unsafe—for example, because it would mask symptoms without curing the problem so as to
prevent a person from knowing that medical advice was needed.143
Although the collateral measures provision was certainly intended to allow consideration of a broader range
of issues than the preceding terms, it is far from clear that social harms were meant to be included. In
fact, deﬁnitions of collateral measures oﬀered by both the FDA and the Justice Department have excluded
consideration of social harms. In a 1985 article, the then-director of the FDA’s Oﬃce of Drug Standards
asserted that three questions were considered in evaluating a drug under the “method of use” and “collateral
measures” prongs: 1) can the disease be self-diagnosed?; 2) are the symptoms self-recognizable?; and 3) can
the condition be self treated?144 Similarly, in a litigation alleging a violation of Section 503(b)(1)(B), the
Justice Department said that collateral measures necessary to safe use mean:
142Id. at 436, 438-439.
143United States v. An Article of Drug...“Decholin,” 264 F. Supp. 473, 481-483 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
144Peter H. Rheinstein, Criteria Used by the FDA to Determine What Classes of Drugs Are Appropriate Switch Candidates,
19 Drug Info. J. 139, 141 (1985).
42all those things which a layman, because of his or her lack of education, training, and
experience, cannot do to safely manage the disease. These include taking a proper history,
doing a physical exam, ordering appropriate laboratory tests, having a knowledge of the
disease that cause [the condition], integrating the results of the history, exam, and tests
with this knowledge, making a diagnosis, designing a treatment plan, and carrying the plan
through with proper continuing evaluation.145
Both of these deﬁnitions give broad scope to the “collateral measures” prong, as urged by the Senate Report,
allowing for a wide variety of considerations beyond the mere toxicity or other inherent characteristics of the
drug.146 Yet, both are limited to scientiﬁc or medical considerations and do not envision a role for social
harms.
Although arguments can be made that both the “other potentialities” and “collateral measures” prongs
were meant to include consideration of social harms, it is probably better to view both of these prongs as
ambiguous on the issue.
3.
Safety
Even if the “other potentialities” or “collateral measures” prongs were broad enough to allow consideration
of social harms, such consideration would still be limited by the requirement of relationship to the safety
of the drug. The Senate Report makes this clear in using the phrase “the collateral measures necessary
to [a drug’s] safe use.”147 Similarly, the court in United States v. An Article of Drug...“Decholin” noted
that its discussion of the Congressional intent behind the word “safety” in relation to the toxicity prong
was equally applicable to the collateral measures prong.148 Based on this, the court rejected the argument
146See S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 4 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 667.
147S. Rep. No. 82-946, at 9 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 672.
148Decholin, 264 F. Supp. at 484. Although the safety requirement has not been directly applied to “other potentialities for
harmful eﬀect,” there is no good reason to apply it to two of the prongs but not the others.
43that eﬀectiveness could generally be considered under the “collateral measures” prong, instead limiting
consideration of eﬀectiveness to the extent that it related to the drug’s safety.149 For social harms to be
considered under the “other potentialities” or “collateral measures” prong consistent with the legislative
history, there would similarly have to be an impact on the safety of the drug. Thus, an inquiry into the
meaning of the term “safety” in Section 503(b)(1)(B) is necessary.
The Senate Report is clear that “‘safe,’ as used in the deﬁnition, is intended to have its ordinary meaning.”150
Less clear is what exactly this ordinary meaning is. The Senate Report said that toxicity, whether or not
the drug is poisonous, is “only one factor to be considered by courts in determining whether a particular
drug is safe for use without medical supervision” and that courts must also consider the other elements of
the deﬁnition: other potentiality for harmful eﬀects, the method of use, and collateral measures necessary
for use.151 Furthermore, the Senate Report noted that this was a broad deﬁnition meant to protect the
public health by covering all drugs that required medical supervision in order to insure their safety.152 From
this evidence, one leading commentator has concluded that “Congress intended a broad range of inquiry in
determining the prescription/nonprescription status of a drug” and that safety was intended to include “any
threat to the public health.”153 Since certain social harms are threats to the public health, they would be
appropriate considerations under this view.
Although it is certainly true that Congress intended a broad deﬁnition of safety, it is questionable whether
this deﬁnition was meant to include social harms.154 The inquiry is still limited to the ordinary deﬁnition
of “unsafe.” Thus, the Decholin court concluded that the deﬁnition of safety limited consideration in two
149Id. at 481-483.
150S. Rep. No. 82-946 (1951), at 4, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 667.
151Id.
152Id. at 4, 9.
153Hutt, supra note 10, at 433.
154See id. at 436 (suggesting that “[t]here is perhaps no issue involving drug use that cannot properly be brought into
consideration under [the method of use and collateral measures necessary for use] factor”).
44ways. First, the potential consequences of the drug must actually be harmful not merely, for example, un-
comfortable or inconvenient.155 Second, there must be a realistic probability, not just the mere possibility,
of this actual harm when the drug is used appropriately.156 The Senate Report provides some guidance as
to what was meant by “harmful” by giving two examples of non-toxic drugs that were unsafe because “un-
supervised use may indirectly cause injury or death.”157 This example suggests that Congress was thinking
about eﬀects on the body (i.e. scientiﬁc or medical harms) and not eﬀects on behavior (i.e. social harms) in
enacting the safety requirement. To the extent this is true, the deﬁnition of safety would exclude social harms.
4.
Summary
Relatively good arguments can be made that two of the provisions of the statutory deﬁnition—“other poten-
tialities for harmful eﬀect” and “collateral measures necessary to its use”—open the door to consideration
of social harms. On the other hand, commentators and the Government have interpreted these phrases as
relating to eﬀects on the body, not eﬀects on behavior. Furthermore, even if social harms could be consid-
ered under these prongs, all factors in the Rx-OTC determination must aﬀect the safety of the drug, which
Congress seemed to limit to eﬀects on the body, such as injury or death. Thus, social harms, which are
eﬀects on behavior, normally would not satisfy the safety requirement. Even if they did cause indirect eﬀects
to the human body, such as the failure to treat a disease due to the high cost of medical care, they likely
would not satisfy the requirement that there be reasonable probability, not just a theoretical possibility, of
an eﬀect on the body.158
155United States v. An Article of Drug...“Decholin,” 264 F. Supp. 473, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
156Id.
157S. Rep. No. 82-946 (1951), at 4, reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 667.
158Decholin, 264 F. Supp. at 480, 484.
45At the very most, the “other potentialities” and “collateral measures” prongs are ambiguous as to whether
consideration of social policy is allowed. This ambiguity is insuﬃcient to overcome the conclusion from the
Congressional objectives that consideration of social harms in the Rx-OTC decision is inconsistent with the
legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments.
IV.
The recent debate over the proposed switch of the emergency contraceptive Plan B from prescription to
over-the-counter status has brought the Durham-Humphrey Amendment and its distinction between Rx
and OTC drugs to the forefront.159 For this reason, the detailed legislative history provided in Parts II
and III is particularly timely and provides useful insight into the appropriateness of considering questions
of social harm, rather than just scientiﬁc and medical evidence, in determining whether to switch Plan B
to nonprescription status. After reviewing the controversy sparked by the proposal to switch Plan B from
prescription to nonprescription status, this section applies the conclusions drawn from the legislative history
of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments to the Plan B debate.
A.
159See, e.g., Gina Kolata, There’s a Blurry Line Between Rx and O.T.C., N.Y. Times, December 21, 2003, 2003 WLNR
5652528. News reports are not always accurate in their description of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments. The New York
Times article cited supra stated that the Amendments “gave the F.D.A. authority to make th[e] determination” as to whether
a drug was prescription or nonprescription. Id.
46A Brief History of the Debate Over Whether to Switch Plan B from Prescription to
Nonprescription Status
1.
The Initial Application and Not Approvable Letter
On April 16, 2003, Women’s Capital Corporation submitted a supplemental new drug application requesting
that its emergency contraceptive, Plan B, be switched from prescription-only to over-the-counter status.160
Pursuant to FDA procedures, this application was submitted to the Oﬃces of Drug Evaluation with re-
sponsibility for reproductive drugs and over-the-counter drugs for concurrent review.161 During this review
process, the FDA held a joint public meeting of its Nonprescription Drugs Advisory Committee and its
Advisory Committee for Reproductive Health Drugs, which voted 23-4 to recommend approval of Plan B
for OTC status on December 16, 2003.162 The FDA missed its February 22, 2004 goal date for deciding on
the Plan B application and extended the deadline to May 21, 2004.163 On April 2, 2004, the Oﬃce of Drug
Evaluation III recommended that Plan B be approved for OTC sale without any age restriction; the Oﬃce
of Drug Evaluation V had made the same recommendation in January.164 After reviewing the recommenda-
tions of the Oﬃces of Drug Evaluation, the Director of the Oﬃce of New Drugs likewise recommended that
Plan B be approved for OTC sale without restriction on April 22, 2004.165
Despite the recommendations of its two advisory committees, its professional staﬀ, the Deputy Directors of
two Oﬃces of Drug Evaluation, and the Director of the Oﬃce of New Drugs, the FDA issued a not-approvable
160GAO Report, supra note 2, at 5.
161Id. at 14.
162Id.
163Id. at 15.
164Id. at 15-16.
165Id. at 19-20.
47letter, rejecting Plan B’s application for OTC status, on May 6, 2004.166 Although regulatory action letters
are normally signed by the Directors of the Oﬃces of Drug Evaluation, Dr. Stephen Galson, the Acting Di-
rector of FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), signed the not-approvable letter because
the review staﬀ and the relevant directors disagreed with his conclusion.167 This was the only one of the
94 action letters regarding Rx to OTC switches issued by the FDA between 1994 and 2004 that was signed
by the Director of CDER.168 In his letter to Barr Pharmaceuticals,169 Dr. Galson expressed concern about
inadequate data supporting safe use by young adolescents without professional supervision170 and rejected
generalization of the actual use data to the whole population of Plan B users “because of inadequate sam-
pling of younger age groups.”171 Dr. Galson’s speciﬁc concern, according to internal FDA documents, was
that young adolescents’ lack of cognitive development made extrapolation of data from older populations
impossible and would cause higher levels of risky sexual behavior, leading to decreased condom use and
increased transmission of STDs.172 The not-approvable letter gave Barr the option of either providing more
data regarding the safe use of Plan B by those under 16 or more support for their proposal to sell Plan B
via a prescription for those under 16 and OTC for those over 16.173
FDA’s review staﬀ, the directors of the relevant oﬃces, and the joint advisory committee all disagreed with
Dr. Galson’s reasoning. The joint advisory committee unanimously concluded that OTC availability of Plan
B would not lead to decreased use of other forms of contraceptives and that Plan B was safe for use in
the nonprescription setting; it also voted 27 to 1 that the actual use study was generalizable to the whole
population.174 The FDA’s professional staﬀ noted that the FDA did not traditionally diﬀerentiate between
166Id. at 20.
167Plan B Q&A, supra note 2, at 3.
168GAO Report, supra note 2, at 30.
169Barr Pharmaceuticals acquired the rights to Plan B from the Women’s Capital Corporation in October 2003.
170Stephen Galson, FDA Not Approvable Letter to Barr Research, Inc. For NDA 21-045/S-011 (Plan B), at 1 (May 6, 2004),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/planB/planB NAletter.pdf [hereinafter Not Approvable Letter].
171Id.
172GAO Report, supra note 2, at 23, 48.
173Not Approvable Letter, supra note 170, at 2.
174Letter from 48 Members of Congress to FDA Commissioner Regarding Delay in Plan B Decision, February 26, 2004, at
48older and younger adolescents and, even if it did, additional information requested from the sponsor and
ongoing studies refuted the concern that increased access to Plan B would lead to increased risky sexual
behavior among teens.175 Similarly, the Director of the Oﬃce of New Drugs stated that the FDA had a
“long history” of extrapolating ﬁndings from older patients to adolescents and the FDA rarely requested
age-speciﬁc data.176 Regardless of normal FDA practice, the review staﬀ noted that suﬃcient adolescents
participated in the actual use study to draw conclusions and, since it was open to all women, the actual
use study was representative of Plan B’s potential market.177 In addition to the abnormality of Dr. Galson
signing the regulatory letter, a General Accounting Oﬃce (“GAO”) report concluded that three other as-
pects of the Plan B review process were unusual: 1) high-level FDA management was abnormally involved;
2) signiﬁcant evidence indicated that the not approvable decision was made in December or January before
the staﬀ review was complete; and 3) Dr. Galson’s rationale was novel and not in accord with traditional
FDA practices.178
2.
The Continuing Saga of the Plan B Rx-OTC Switch
Since its initial not-approvable decision, the FDA has repeatedly promised a ﬁnal decision on the Plan B Rx
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/story.asp?ID=305. The ﬁrst two votes were not limited to consideration of adolescent
behavior, but since adolescents were a signiﬁcant foreseeable population of Plan B users, the votes certainly took into account
concerns about their behavior.
175GAO Report, supra note 2, at 24-26. Dr. Galson concluded that these studies were not reliable because they did not replicate
the conditions under which young adolescents would be using OTC Plan B—namely without any assistance or education. Id. at
25. However, the joint advisory committee had also voted 27 to 1, based on the actual use study, that consumers (which would
include adolescents) could use Plan B appropriately by following the label. Id. at 26. See also Director, Oﬃce of New Drugs,
Oﬃcial Memorandum on His Decision on the Plan B Application (April 22, 2004), at 2, reprinted in GAO Report, supra note
2, at 52 [hereinafter Oﬃce of New Drugs Memo] (“The Agency has not heretofore distinguished the safety and eﬃcacy of Plan
B and other forms of hormonal contraception among diﬀerent ages of women of childbearing potential and I am not aware of
any compelling scientiﬁc reason for such a distinction in this case.”).
176Oﬃce of New Drugs Memo, supra note 175, at 2.
177GAO Report, supra note 2, at 27. Likewise, the joint advisory committee “voted 27 to 1 that the actual use study data
was generalizable to the overall population of OTC users, including adolescents.” Id. at 28-29.
178Id. at 19-29.
49to OTC switch but has failed to deliver. In a June 2nd meeting with the chairman of the House subcommittee
with oversight for the FDA, Dr. Galson implied that the FDA was likely to approve Plan B within six months
for women over age 16.179 On July 21, 2004, Barr Pharmaceuticals resubmitted its supplemental new drug
application and proposed that Plan B be switched to OTC status for women 16 years of age and older only
while remaining prescription-only for those under 16.180 Despite Dr. Galson’s implication of a quick decision,
the FDA missed its January 2005 target deadline for ruling on the revised supplemental NDA, which FDA
Acting Commissioner Lester Crawford admitted was unusual.181 By March 2005, when Dr. Crawford took
to Capitol Hill for conﬁrmation hearings on his nomination to become Commissioner, the FDA still had not
made a decision on Barr’s second submission, much to the chagrin of several Senators. In response to a
question as to when the decision would be issued, Dr. Crawford said, “I wouldn’t want to say days. I would
say weeks.”182 In addition to stating the decision was imminent, Dr. Crawford, like Dr. Galson before him,
implied to Congress that approval was likely, saying that the science was done and only the labeling was left,
the FDA “had no real dispute” with the label, and, more explicitly, that “[t]his is going to be a very unusual
sort of approval.”183 A few weeks later, when a decision still had not been made on Plan B, Senators Hillary
Rodham Clinton, Democrat of New York, and Patty Murray, Democrat of Washington, put a hold on Dr.
Crawford’s nomination to become Commissioner until the FDA made a Plan B decision.184 The Senators
only lifted their hold when Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael O. Leavitt provided a written
179Marc Kaufman, Staﬀ Scientists Reject FDA’s Plan B Reasoning, Washington Post, June 18, 2004, at A2,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50466-2004Jun17.html; Bob Cusack, FDA Likely to Approve Plan B Pill,
The Hill, June 9, 2004, http://www.hillnews.com/news/060904/fda.aspx. It is possible that Congressman Greenwood read too
much into what Dr. Galson told him. According to Greenwood, “There was no guarantee from Galson, but he said their only
concerns were for girls under 16, and I took that to mean they would approve it OTC for everyone else quite soon.” Kaufman,
supra.
180Leslie M. Crawford, Letter from FDA Commissioner to Duramed Research Stating that FDA is Unable to Make a Deci-
sion on Supplemental NDA (August 26, 2005), at 1, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/planB/Plan B letter20050826.pdf
[hereinafter No Decision Letter].
181Harris, supra note 1. Dr. Crawford’s admission occurred at his conﬁrmation hearings to become Commissioner. Id.
182Id.
183Marc Kaufman, FDA Expects to Ease Plan B Availability, Washington Post, March 18, 2005, at A10,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45610-2005Mar17.html; Harris, supra note 1.
184Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Democrats Block Nomination Over Morning-After Pill, N.Y. Times, April 7, 2005, at A19, 2005
WLNR 5415573.
50promise that the FDA would act on the resubmitted supplemental NDA by September 1, 2005, almost eight
months after a decision was originally due.185
Despite Dr. Crawford’s Senate testimony that a decision, likely positive, was imminent and Secretary
Leavitt’s written promise that a decision would be made by September 1st, on August 26, 2005, Dr. Crawford
sent a letter to Barr Pharmaceuticals saying that, while the FDA had concluded that Plan B was appropriate
for OTC status for women age 17 and older, it was “unable at this time to reach a decision on the approvability
of the application.”186 The FDA cited concerns as to whether it had authority to allow a drug to be marketed
as both Rx and OTC at the same time, whether a drug may be both Rx and OTC based on the age of
the individual, whether an age-based distinction could be enforced, and whether Rx and OTC versions of
the same product can be marketed in the same package.187 At the same time, the FDA issued an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking requesting comments on whether it should initiate a rulemaking to codify its
interpretation that, on rare occasions, Section 503(b) of the FD&C Act allows an active ingredient to be
marketed as both a prescription and a nonprescription drug at the same time.188 Although Senators Clinton
and Murray claimed that their agreement had been violated, Secretary Leavitt asserted that the indeﬁnite
delay of decision was “an action” within the meaning of his written promise to the Senators.189
In May 2006, over three years after Plan B’s switch to OTC status was ﬁrst proposed and over a year after
the FDA was supposed to make its decision on Barr’s resubmitted application, the FDA’s decision was still
indeﬁnitely delayed. In response, Senators Clinton and Murray vowed in March to block another nominee
for FDA Commissioner until a decision was made.190 Thus, the strange history of Plan B continues.
185Gardiner Harris, Oﬃcial Quits on Pill Delay at the F.D.A., N.Y. Times, September 1, 2005, at A12, 2005 WLNR 13732211.
186No Decision Letter, supra note 180, at 1.
187Id.
188Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Drug Approvals: Circumstances Under Which an Active Ingredient May Be
Simultaneously Marketed in Both a Prescription Drug Product and an Over-the-Counter Drug Product, 70 Fed. Reg. 52050
(2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/05n-0345-nap001.pdf.
189Harris, supra note 185.
190Editorial, Time to Stall Bush Nominee, N.Y. Times, March 25, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/25/opinion/25sat1.html.
51B.
Social Harms, the Plan B Decision, and the Durham-Humphrey Amendments
As discussed supra, the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments limits the Rx-OTC deci-
sion to scientiﬁc and medical considerations. According to both Dr. Galson,191 who was responsible for the
initial not-approvable letter, and Dr. Crawford,192 who issued the subsequent no decision determination, the
FDA’s decision was based just on questions of science and did not consider politics or social policy. However,
it is far from clear that these oﬃcial explanations reﬂect what really happened.
Neither Dr. Galson, nor anyone else involved in the Plan B approval process, has suggested that Plan B
itself, even with repeated uses, has a harmful eﬀect on the consumer’s body.193 Instead, Dr. Galson’s oﬃcial
reason for issuing the not-approvable letter was the inadequacy of evidence that young adolescents could use
Plan B safely without supervision; speciﬁcally, he was concerned that their immature cognitive development
would lead them to engage in increased risky sexual behavior knowing that Plan B was easily available.194
To the extent that his concerns regarding promiscuity merely reﬂected societal disapproval of teen sexual
activity, or at least of frequent teen sexual activity with various partners, this would be a concern solely
relating to Plan B’s eﬀect on behavior, a social consideration inconsistent with the legislative history of the
Durham-Humphrey Amendments. In fact, Dr. Galson admitted the inappropriateness of such a considera-
tion, saying, “Some staﬀ have expressed the concern that this decision is based on non-medical implications
191Cusack, supra note 179 (“Galson has said that his May 6 decision on Plan B was not inﬂuenced by political pressure and
that the White House was not involved.”); Acting Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Oﬃcial Memorandum
Explaining His Not-Approvable Decision (May 6, 2004), at 2, reprinted in GAO Report, supra note 2, at 49 [hereinafter Galson
memo] (“Some staﬀ have expressed the concern that this decision is based on non-medical implications of teen sexual behavior,
or judgments about the propriety of this activity. These issues are beyond the scope of our drug approval process, and I have
not considered them in this decision.”).
192Harris, supra note 1 (“I can assure you that this decision will not be based on politics. It will be based on science.”).
193But see Gina Kolata, Debate on Selling Morning-After Pill Over the Counter, N.Y. Times, December 12, 2003, at A1, 2003
WLNR 5670940 (“Opponents say the over-the-counter rule would be an invitation to medical nightmares, with some people,
particularly teenagers, using the pills repeatedly and not telling anyone even if they have complications. The safety of repeated
use has not been well studied.”). This story was written very early in the Plan B OTC approval process, and no one in the
FDA, or even opponents of Plan B outside of the FDA, has suggested recently that Plan B itself poses a safety risk. Instead,
the focus has been on Plan B’s eﬀect on teen sexual behavior.
194See supra, Part IVA, Section 1.
52of teen sexual behavior, or judgments about the propriety of this activity. These issues are beyond the
scope of our drug approval process, and I have not considered them in this decision.”195 Instead, he claimed
his real concern was that easy access to Plan B would increase transmission of sexual diseases through the
combination of increased promiscuity and decreased condom use.196 If it could be persuasively demonstrated
that increased access to Plan B had a causal relationship to increased promiscuity and decreased condom
use which in turn had a causal relationship to increased transmission of STDs, this would be an eﬀect, albeit
indirect, of Plan B on the body of the consumer and therefore a scientiﬁc or medical harm. Under the
legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments, such consideration would be appropriate under
either the “other potentialities for harmful eﬀect” or “collateral measures necessary to its use” prong.
For two reasons, however, Dr. Galson’s consideration of promiscuity, condom use, and STDs is inconsistent
with the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments. First, it fails the requirement, necessi-
tated by the common deﬁnition of “unsafe,” that there be a reasonable probability, not a mere possibility,
that the medical or scientiﬁc harm—in this case, the increased transmission of sexual diseases—will actually
result.197 The chain of reasoning requires one to assume: 1) adolescents prior to engaging in sexual activity
will know about the easy availability of Plan B; 2) they will be thinking about this easy availability in making
decisions regarding sexual activity; 3) because of the easy availability of Plan B, they will have more sex
with more partners using less protection; 4) increased transmission of sexual disease will result; and 5) the
sexual disease will cause actual harm. Given that this reasoning requires consideration of how people would
change their behavior if the drug were more easily accessible, essentially a social question unusual for the
Rx-OTC switch,198 it seems too attenuated to ﬁt within the ordinary deﬁnition of “unsafe” envisioned by
195Galson memo, supra note 191, at 2.
196GAO Report, supra note 2, at 23.
197See United States v. An Article of Drug...“Decholin,” 264 F. Supp. 473, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1967); see generally, supra,
Part IIIB, Section 3.
198Gardiner Harris, Morning-After-Pill Ruling Deﬁes Norm, N.Y. Times, May 8, 2004, at A13, 2004 WLNR 5363030. The
unprecedented nature of consideration of how behavior might change based on the availability of a drug was raised by a
representative of Planned Parenthood and therefore is admittedly of questionable reliability. However, the reasoning was quite
53the legislative history. In fact, the Director of one Oﬃce of Drug Evaluation called Dr. Galson’s concern as
to increased STD transmission “speculative.”199
More importantly, Dr. Galson’s medical rationale was inappropriate for the Rx-OTC determination because
it was not generally accepted, as Congress intended medical or scientiﬁc considerations to be. For starters,
the OTC status of Plan B is supported by leading medical associations, including the American Medical
Association and, in particular given Dr. Galson’s concern about adolescent use, the American Academy of
Pediatrics and the Society for Adolescent Medicine.200 Furthermore, the joint advisory committee, made
up of leading scientiﬁc experts on both OTC and reproductive issues, rejected Dr. Galson’s concerns as
“unsupported by existing studies, common sense and real world experience,” voting 27 to 1 that the actual
use study was generalizable to the whole population of potential users and 23 to 4 to approve Plan B’s OTC
status.201 This was the only example in the past ten years where the FDA refused to follow an advisory
committee’s recommendation to switch a drug to OTC status.202 Similarly, the FDA’s professional staﬀ,
after considering all ﬁve studies that provided emergency contraceptives in advance to study participants to
assess the behavioral impact of OTC access, rejected the assertion that easy access to Plan B could lead to
increased risky sexual behavior, concluding that it did not lead to use as a substitute form of birth control,
did not increase the number of sexual partners or frequency of unprotected sex, and did not increase the
frequency of STDs.203 Dr. Galson admitted that it was uncommon to overrule staﬀ recommendations, saying
persuasive. He noted that the FDA certainly would not “ask the makers of anticholesterol pills if people would eat more
cheeseburgers when their drugs became available over the counter.” Id.
199Kaufman, supra note 183.
200See National Partnership for Women & Families, Testimony in Support of Over-the-Counter (OTC)
Status for Plan B Before the FDA Joint Advisory Committee, December 16, 2003, at http://
www.nationalpartnership.org/portals/p3/library/ReproHealthMedicalTech/PlanBTestimonyDec03.pdf; Letter from 48
Members of Congress to FDA Commissioner Regarding Delay in Plan B Decision, supra note 174. Other medical groups
endorsing OTC availability for Plan B included the American Academy of Family Physicians and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, as well as more than seventy other medical and public health organizations. See National
Partnership for Women & Families, supra.
201Editorial, Science or Politics at the F.D.A.?, N.Y. Times, February 24, 2004, at A24, 2004 WLNR 5575199; GAO Report,
supra note 2, at 28-29.
202GAO Report, supra note 2, at 29.
203Id. at 25-27. Only one member of the review staﬀ thought there was any reason to be concerned about a possible increase in
sexual behavior, asserting that the data was inadequate. However, that staﬀ member still recommended an approvable decision.
54that it occurred only one other time in the past 10 years; overruling both an advisory committee and staﬀ
recommendation may be even rarer, with several former FDA oﬃcials saying they could not think of a single
other instance where this occurred.204 Dr. Galson’s only scientiﬁc or medical support—beyond his own
opinion that the studies were inconclusive because they did not suﬃciently replicate the conditions of OTC
Plan B use—was a minority report ﬁled by one dissident member of the joint advisory committee.205 This
seems to conﬁrm the concerns expressed during the Durham-Humphrey Amendment debate that the scien-
tiﬁc opinion version would insuﬃciently constrain the Administrator because he “could select the particular
experts who hold opinions that suit his purpose.”206 Though increased transmission of sexual diseases is ap-
propriately labeled scientiﬁc or medical, the concern is speculative and not supported by generally accepted
scientiﬁc opinions. Thus, it is an inappropriate consideration for the Rx-OTC switch under the legislative
history of Section 503(b).
Despite Dr. Galson’s assertion that social harms and politics played no role in his decision, many have
concluded to the contrary based on the speculative nature of, and the lack of support for, the STD concern.
Even within the FDA, the Director of the Oﬃce of New Drugs suggested this interpretation in an internal
memorandum, saying,
Id. at 26 n.46.
204Harris, supra note 198.
205The minority report was written by Dr. David Hager, a Kentucky gynecologist and strong anti-abortion advocate who
refuses to prescribe Plan B to his patients. Dr. Hager alleged that someone at the FDA asked him to the write the minority
report, which cited the same concerns that would eventually be given in the not approvable letter. Lesley Stahl, The Debate
Over Plan B, CBS News, Nov. 27, 2005, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories /2005/11/22/60minutes/main1068924.shtml.
Despite Dr. Hager’s allegations, the FDA denied that it requested the minority report. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 14
n.32
206Senate Hearings, 82nd Cong. 146 (1951), reprinted in FDA, supra note 32, at 509 (statement of Dr. Frederick J. Cullen,
Executive Vice President of the Proprietary Association of Washington, D.C.).
55Products that are indicated for uses related to sexual activity in adolescents raise concerns
for some people that go beyond a ﬁnding based on clinical trial data that the product
is safe and eﬀective for its intended use in adolescents. These concerns are derived from
individual views and attitudes about the morality of adolescent sexual behavior and also
overlap with concerns about the role for parents and health care professionals in decisions
about contraceptive use in adolescents....While OTC access to Plan B for adolescents may
be controversial from a societal perspective, I cannot think of any age group where the
beneﬁt of preventing unplanned pregnancies and abortion is more important and more
compelling.207
Consistent with this view, some critics assert that the decision was actually based on FDA concerns over
social harms, such as the possible increase in promiscuity and the belief that use of Plan B is a form of
abortion.208 Other critics assert that the decision was made in response to pressure from conservatives
and the White House,209 whose traditional stances on moral and reproductive issues made these potential
social harms particularly worrisome. In addition to Dr. Galson’s nearly unprecedented overruling of the
recommendations of both the FDA staﬀ and joint advisory committee, indications of outside pressure in the
FDA decision-making process include: that the Commissioner of the FDA recommended a not-approvable
letter; that the decision was made at a higher level than the Oﬃce of Drug Evaluation, contrary to normal
practice; that the decision to deny approval to Plan B allegedly was made in December or January, several
months before the review process was complete; that someone within the FDA may have requested a minority
opinion from a member of the advisory panel;210 and that Dr. Susan F. Wood, Director of FDA’s Oﬃce
of Woman’s Health, quit because she thought abortion politics were trumping the scientiﬁc and medical
evidence.211
Consultation between the political branches and the FDA during the Rx-OTC approval process is not in
itself inappropriate under the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments. In fact, it promotes
208Rubin, supra note 5.
209Id.
210See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 14 n.32 & 16-22.
211Harris, supra note 185.
56the accountability that many members of Congress were concerned would be lacking if the FDA made the
Rx-OTC determination. However, if the FDA acted in response to social harms, either on their own or in
response to pressure from political actors, in denying OTC status to Plan B, their decision contravened the
legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments. Even if the decision was actually based on the
scientiﬁc rationale asserted by the FDA—concern about increased transmission of STDs—the FDA’s decision
was still inconsistent with Congressional intent because their scientiﬁc considerations were only speculative
and inadequately accepted by expert medical and scientiﬁc opinion.212
V.
The best conclusion to be drawn from the prior sections is that the Plan B decision was inconsistent with
the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments, the governing legislative standard for the
Rx-OTC switch determination. Since administrative agencies like the FDA derive their authority from
Congress,213 a decision by the FDA inconsistent with the power delegated by Congress exceeds the scope of
its authority and is therefore illegitimate.214 If this is true of the Plan B decision, it must be equally true
of every Rx-OTC decision that considers social harms. And yet, despite the absence of social harms in the
212Dr. Crawford’s August 2005 decision focused on FDA authority, labeling, and packaging and therefore did not directly
implicate the deﬁnition of a prescription drug or the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments. However,
even though the FDA had long interpreted Section 503(b) to allow simultaneous marketing of an active ingredient as both
prescription-only and OTC, it decided suddenly with Plan B to engage in rule-making to codify this interpretation, a decision
that was sure to engender delays. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 188, at 4-5. From this, it is possible
to conclude that these superﬁcial FDA concerns actually provided cover for considerations of social harm.
213See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 1 (2d ed. 2001) (“Agencies are generally created
by, and draw their power from, the legislature.”).
214See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (noting that agency decision-making must conform to an intelligible principle provided by Congress
in a legislative act).
57FDA’s oﬃcial Rx-OTC switch policy,215 both common sense and reasoned analysis by the commentators216
suggest that the FDA must consider at least some social harms on at least some Rx-OTC decisions. Does
this mean that the FDA is systematically exceeding the scope of its delegated authority? Probably not.
Changed circumstances since 1951 have undermined the basis on which the Congressional intent for the
Durham-Humphrey Amendments rested and support the consideration of at least some social harms in at
least some circumstances. In particular, the 1962 Drug Amendments revealed a diﬀerent Congressional vision
of drug regulation from that in 1951 and suggest that, while Congress did not alter the Rx-OTC standard,
the authority it delegated to the FDA under it changed signiﬁcantly after 1962. Thus, a brief consideration
of the 1962 Drug Amendments is necessary to truly understand the appropriate role of social harms in the
Plan B Rx-OTC decision.217
A.
Changed Circumstances and a Changed Congressional Intent?
Subsequent events since 1951 have undermined all four Congressional objectives that supported limiting the
Rx-OTC decision to medical or scientiﬁc considerations. The strong emphasis on self-medication reﬂected
in the Durham-Humphrey debates218 dimmed after 1951 as the “therapeutic revolution” that began in the
1930s and accelerated after World War II brought an explosion of new drugs. 219 Reasonable concerns
about the greater potency of these new drugs caused manufacturers, with the FDA’s assent, to limit them to
215See Rheinstein, supra note 19, at 140-142; see also Galson memo, supra note 191, at 49 (stating that the non-medical
implications of teen sexual behavior or judgments about its propriety “are beyond the scope of our drug approval process.”)
216See Pray, supra note 8, at 186 (noting that the agency often considers other factors, such as social impact, in the Rx-OTC
decision even though it is not in the formal policy); Hutt, supra note 10, at 438 (“It is readily apparent, however, that many
determinations of prescription/nonprescription status depend in large measure upon unarticulated principles of social policy.”).
217Since the focus of this paper is on the Durham-Humphrey Amendments and their relationship to the Plan B decision,
detailed consideration of the 1962 Drug Amendments is beyond its scope. However, an admittedly not comprehensive inquiry
into the changes made by the Amendments is necessary to truly understand the relationship between social harms, the Plan B
decision, and the Durham-Humphrey Amendments.
218See Part IIIA, Section 3.
219See generally Temin, supra note 8, at 58-82.
58prescription-only, resulting in a system that emphasized the “doctor’s power to heal the patient, as opposed
to assisting sick people to heal themselves.”220 The requisite knowledge consumers would need to make
choices between the increased number of potent and complex drugs means that the traditional notion of
self-medication is no longer a viable option.221
In response to the therapeutic revolution, the 1962 Drug Amendments fundamentally altered the power
given by Congress to the FDA. Two changes are particularly relevant for present purposes. First, the 1962
Act required the FDA to ﬁnd substantial evidence of eﬀectiveness in order to approve a new drug or keep
an approved drug on the market.222 Since the Drug Amendments applied to OTC drugs introduced to
the market after 1938,223 Congress in 1962 expressly departed from one of its objectives in enacting the
Durham-Humphrey Amendments: to eliminate the eﬀectiveness requirement for OTC marketing. Congress’
elimination in 1951, and subsequent reinclusion in 1962, of eﬃcacy is of admittedly limited relevance to the
consideration social harms, but it does reveal a broadening of the Rx-OTC determination after 1962 and
casts some doubt on the continuing importance of the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amend-
ments.
220Id. at 82-83. The declining emphasis on self-medication is revealed by pharmaceutical manufacturers’ distribution of
advertising dollars: the share of advertising dollars directed at consumers (rather than doctors) went from 90% around 1930
to 20% in 1972. Id. at 84. Whether this was the cause (i.e. because manufacturers were directing less advertising at them,
consumers were unable to choose between drugs and thereby needed the help of a doctor) or the eﬀect (i.e. because consumers
were relying on doctors rather than self-medicating, there was no need to direct advertising at them), it shows a substantial
erosion in self-medication in the United States in the period just before and after the passage of the Durham-Humphrey
Amendments.
221Id. at 119. However, several commentators have noted a recent increase in emphasis on self-medication as a way to reduce
healthcare costs by avoiding visits to the doctor. See Stephen Paul Mahinka & M. Elizabeth Bierman, Direct to OTC Marketing
of Drugs: Possible Approaches, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 49, 50 (1995) (“[P]harmaceutical companies are facing increasing political
and economic pressures to reduce health care costs by encouraging appropriate self-medication eﬀorts.”); Henri R. Manasse, Jr.
& Hong Xiao, Scope of Medication Use in the United States and Attendant Issues, 44 Drake L. Rev. 471, 471-472 (1996) (“Self-
medication and OTC drugs have become increasingly popular as the self-care movement has expanded and as individuals act to
reduce their personal expenditures for physician visits.”). Insurance companies and managed care organizations, not consumers,
are likely to beneﬁt from this new emphasis, as insurance reimbursement and tax deductions often make prescription drugs
cheaper to consumers than their OTC counterparts. See Lance W. Rook, Listening to Zantac: The Role of Nonprescription
Drugs in Health Care Reform and the Federal Tax System, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 107, 108-109 (1994); see also Pray, supra note
8, at 179 (noting that a managed care company in 2001 petitioned the FDA to switch three allergy medicines from Rx to OTC
status).
222See Notes, Drug Eﬃcacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 Geo. L.J. 185, 192-193 (1971).
223See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 478, 588 (2d ed. 1991).
59The 1962 Drug Amendments also changed the nature of the FDA’s new drug regulation from pre-market
review to pre-market approval. Prior to 1962, a drug was approved for marketing unless the FDA objected
within 60 days of submission of an NDA that the drug was unsafe.224 This delegated to the drug man-
ufacturer the primary obligation for applying the deﬁnition of a prescription drug, with the FDA limited
to proving that the drug was not safe for nonprescription sale if it disagreed with the manufacturer’s de-
termination. By contrast, the 1962 Drug Amendments required aﬃrmative FDA approval225 for all OTC
drugs introduced since 1938.226 This required the FDA to itself apply the deﬁnition of prescription drugs
in the ﬁrst instance to determine whether a drug should be prescription-only or OTC. Thus, Congress in
1962 enacted, in function if not form, the administrative deﬁnition of a prescription drug resisted so vehe-
mently (and successfully) by the pharmaceutical industry and their Congressional supporters in 1951. This
expanded FDA role also provided new life to the provision of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments making
drugs prescription-only if they were so limited by their NDAs.227 Prior to 1962, this provision was incon-
sistent with the Congressional intent to severely limit the power of the FDA in the Rx-OTC decision and
is best explained by a failure of Congress to appreciate its signiﬁcance.228 But given the FDA’s post-1962
ability to reject marketing approval of a drug, allowing the FDA to limit a drug to prescription-only status
as a condition for approval of an NDA is well within the authority Congress delegated to the FDA. Thus,
with the new power of pre-market approval and the existing, though perhaps dormant, power to make the
Rx-OTC decision in the NDA, the FDA after 1962 had essentially the same authority to create an adminis-
trative listing of prescription-only drugs rejected by Congress in 1951. The FDA’s expanded role minimizes
224See Notes, supra note 222, at 188-189. Thus, the FDA did play a role in deﬁning a prescription-only drug. If it disagreed
with the manufacturer’s choice, it could object to the proposed OTC labeling as unsafe. However, it would have the burden to
prove this. Absent such aﬃrmative action by the FDA, the manufacturer would be responsible for the ultimate determination
as to whether the drug was Rx or OTC.
225See id. at 192.
226See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 223, at 478, 588.
227See 21 U.S.C. §353(b)(1)(B) (2006) (requiring a drug to be dispensed only by prescription if it “is limited by an approved
application under section 355 of this title [the new drug section] to use under the professional supervision of a practitioner
licensed by law to administer such drug”).
228See supra, n. 90 & Part IIIA, Section 1.
60any inconsistency that would result from consideration of social harms by varying manufacturers since the
FDA can insure that similar products are marketed in the same manner.229
Moreover, the 1962 Drug Amendments gave to the FDA the primary role in making the Rx-OTC determi-
nation, the very power that Congress sought to prevent in enacting its chosen deﬁnition in the Durham-
Humphrey Amendments. Thus, Congress eﬀectively reversed its 1951 objective of limiting the power of the
FDA and instead determined that broad FDA discretion was necessary for eﬀective regulation of the drug
industry. Given this broad discretion and the revitalized NDA provision of the Durham-Humphrey Amend-
ments, consideration of social harms is far more appropriate now than it was under the FDA’s limited powers
in 1951.
More fundamentally, Congress expanded the powers delegated to the FDA in making the Rx-OTC decision
in 1962, though leaving the statutory standard unchanged. Prior to 1962, Congress had essentially deter-
mined that for all non-dangerous drugs, the beneﬁts of easy access outweighed any other considerations,
including social harms. The FDA was merely delegated the authority to weed out dangerous drugs (i.e.
those with signiﬁcant medical or scientiﬁc harms) through its power to object to unsafe drugs. For the
FDA to consider social harms in a regime where new drugs could be marketed unless the FDA could prove
they were unsafe would undermine social policy choices already implicitly made by Congress and exceed the
scope of its delegation. However, the aﬃrmative FDA approval of drugs, including OTC drugs introduced
since 1938, required by the 1962 Drug Amendments eﬀectively withdrew Congress’ wholesale determination
that all drugs should be available for self-medication as long as they were not dangerous. Instead, Congress
delegated to the FDA the role of weighing the beneﬁts and costs of drugs on an individual basis to determine
whether marketing of the drug, or OTC marketing in particular, was in the best interest of society.230 Since
229The power of the FDA to insure consistency is demonstrated by its ability to switch a drug from prescription to OTC
without the consent of the manufacturer via the switch regulation. See Pray, supra note 8, at 178.
230See Temin, supra note 8, at 127-128, 138 (describing the 1962 Drug Amendments move to having the FDA, rather than
consumers or doctors, judge the worthiness of a drug); see also id. at 202 (detailing the hierarchical structure of the drug
market today where the FDA and its expert panels have complete control over the drugs that can be prescribed and sometimes
61certain social harms are real societal costs of marketing an OTC drug—for example, if prescription-only
status would be unproﬁtable for manufacturers and deter drug development—failure to consider these would
skew the FDA’s determination, leading to a sub-optimal level of OTC switches. Thus, while considering
social harms would have exceeded Congress’ pre-1962 delegation of authority to the FDA, failing to consider
any social harms after 1962 would prevent the FDA from doing the full job delegated to it by Congress.231
B.
Did the FDA’s Plan B Decision Exceed the Scope of Its Delegated Powers?
The increased authority delegated to the FDA in the 1962 Drug Amendments suggests that at least some
social harms are appropriately considered in the Rx-OTC decision. However, given the contrary conclusions
from the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments, social harms should only be considered
if they relate to the additional power delegated by Congress to the FDA in 1962.232 Thus, they should reﬂect
true costs that must be weighed in determining whether OTC marketing of a drug is in the best interest of
society. No perfect line can be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable consideration of social harms,233
even when they can be prescribed). Although this is an accurate description of the role of the FDA in the post-1962 world, it
should be noted that not all commentators support this role; some argue that people, in consultation with their doctors, should
be able to take risks that the FDA does not consider acceptable in order to treat, for example, terminal conditions. See id. at
204-215; see also Peter Barton Hutt, Laetrile Decision Ignores Constitutional Question, Legal Times of Washington, July
2, 1979, reprinted in Hutt & Merrill, supra note 223, at 585.
231Since the textual deﬁnition of a prescription drug is unaltered from that enacted in 1951, a textual hook for consideration
of social harms is necessary. Although Part IIIB, supra, concluded that Congress did not intend the “other potentialities for
harmful eﬀect” or “collateral measures necessary to its use” prongs to allow social harms, these provisions should be given the
broad reading allowed by their text in light of the changed Congressional intent represented by the 1962 Drug Amendments.
For similar reasons, the ordinary deﬁnition of safety should be read as covering at least some social harms.
232See Aman & Mayton, supra note 213, at 613 (stating that power delegated by Congressional statutes to agencies “deﬁnes
the scope of the agency’s authority”).
233For example, assertions by the FDA or Plan B opponents that OTC status would interfere with the obligation of parents
of teenagers to participate in and advise their children on major life decisions intuitively seems to be a valid social harm to
consider. However, while it would likely pass the generally accepted and reasonably probable requirements discussed infra, it
would not satisfy the quantiﬁable requirement, making it an invalid social harm under the proposed standard. Thus, the line
drawn between acceptable and unacceptable social harms is not perfect, but it does provide a framework for limiting FDA
departure from the legislative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments to only that which is necessary to fulﬁll the
FDA’s obligations under the 1962 Drug Amendments.
62but some general criteria can be identiﬁed, criteria that suggest that the FDA exceeded the scope of its
authority in making the Plan B decision.
First, only social harms that can be quantiﬁed can be weighed in the cost-beneﬁt analysis required by the
1962 Drug Amendments. To the extent that opposition to abortion or conservative religious or social views
motivated the FDA, its Plan B decision would fail the quantiﬁable requirement. On the other hand, if
FDA was actually motivated by the social harms it identiﬁed—increased promiscuity and decreased condom
use—the Plan B decision would satisfy this test. Second, and perhaps most controversially, a social issue
can only be considered a true cost to society that must be balanced in the Rx-OTC decision if society
generally recognizes it as harmful. For example, Plan B concerns related to abortion would not qualify as
an appropriate social consideration because of the American public’s deep division over whether abortion
is really a societal harm. On the other hand, the FDA’s concern about decreased condom use would likely
be accepted by the general American public, if not all Americans, as a cost to society. Promiscuity is a
much more diﬃcult issue since it could reasonably be argued that the American public is divided on the
appropriateness of teen sexual activity. However, it seems correct that most Americans are opposed to teen
promiscuity—casual sexual relations with a variety of partners. At the very least, the FDA’s conclusion
that teen promiscuity is a generally recognized social harm would satisfy the limited review standard of the
Administrative Procedure Act.234
Finally, a potential social harm can only be labeled a cost to society that must be weighed by the FDA if
234See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1996). The general review standard in the APA focuses on whether the agency action was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id. The conclusion that teen promiscuity (as opposed to teen sexual activity) is a generally
accepted harm certainly would not be either arbitrary or capricious nor an abuse of the FDA’s discretion.
63there is a realistic probability, not just the mere possibility, that it will result if the drug is available OTC.235
If evidence showed that increased promiscuity or decreased condom use were realistic probabilities, these
would be acceptable social harms to consider. However, the division within the FDA over whether increased
access to Plan B actually aﬀected teen sexual behavior236 raises the question of whether the claimed social
harms were really probable or whether senior FDA oﬃcials were inappropriately adding hypothetical social
harms to the cost-beneﬁt scale. The FDA review staﬀ pointed to the only ﬁve studies to investigate the
behavioral impact of easy access to emergency contraceptives and concluded that the evidence showed that
Plan B would not be used by adolescents as a substitute for normal contraception, there would not be an
increase in the number of sexual partners or the frequency of unprotected sex, and there would not be an
increase in the frequency of STDs.237 In rejecting these conclusions, senior FDA oﬃcials expressed doubt
as to the reliability of these studies but pointed to no evidence, beyond their own beliefs, to support their
conclusion that increased access to Plan B would lead to increased promiscuity and decreased condom use.
Thus, unless the FDA can provide evidence to support its conclusions regarding promiscuity and condom
use, these social harms seem to be only hypothetical possibilities, not realistic probabilities, and therefore
inappropriate for consideration in the Rx-OTC switch.238
Given the lack of evidence of scientiﬁc or medical harms caused by Plan B, the best conclusion possible is
that the FDA rejected Plan B’s application for OTC status because of the alleged social harms of increased
235See United States v. An Article of Drug...“Decholin,” 264 F. Supp. 473, 480 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
236The FDA review staﬀ, based on the results of all ﬁve studies that gave emergency contraceptives to participants in advance
to study their behavioral impact, concluded that easier access to emergency contraceptives did not lead to: 1) inappropriate
use by adolescents as a substitute form of contraception; 2) an increase in the number of sexual partners or the frequency of
unprotected sex; or 3) an increase in the frequency of STDs. See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 26-27. Dr. Galson believed
that these studies were not reliable since their conditions did not replicate the actual conditions of OTC use. Id. at 24-25.
237See GAO Report, supra note 2, at 26-27.
238The lack of any evidence to support the conclusions of senior FDA oﬃcials and the contrary evidence relied on by the FDA
review staﬀ suggests that a conclusion by the FDA that there is a realistic probability of these social harms would not survive
even arbitrary and capricious court review.
64teen promiscuity and decreased teen condom use,239 considerations that are inappropriate under the leg-
islative history of the Durham-Humphrey Amendments. Although the 1962 Drug Amendments expanded
the Congressional delegation of Rx-OTC power to the FDA, allowing consideration of quantiﬁable, generally
accepted, reasonably probable social harms, increased teen promiscuity and decreased teen condom use were
not reasonably probable. Thus, the FDA’s Plan B decision exceeded the scope of its delegated authority.
More concerning than the fact that the FDA exceeded its authority is its repeated denial that social harms
factored into its decision. For the administrative state to be consistent with our representative democracy,
transparency in decision-making is necessary to insure that agencies remain within the scope of the powers
delegated by Congress.240 In the Plan B context, transparency would have allowed interested parties to
demonstrate that the FDA’s feared social harms were in fact just mere possibilities, not realistic probabil-
ities. More importantly, transparency would better enable Congress to hold FDA oﬃcials accountable for
considering inappropriate social harms through Congressional oversight, budget controls, and conﬁrmation
hearings. Finally, to the extent that the FDA’s considerations reﬂected the desires of the Bush Administra-
tion, transparency would promote accountability at the ballot box.241 Thus, forthright acknowledgment by
the FDA that social harms are inﬂuencing an Rx-OTC decision is necessary to insure that the FDA remains
within the limited power to consider social harms that results from the interplay of the Durham-Humphrey
Amendments and the 1962 Drug Amendments.
239See supra, Part IVB, Section 1.
240See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Politics By Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the
Food Quality Protection Act, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 103, 203 (2001) (“Transparency is a general desiderata for all regulatory
decisionmaking because it helps ensure agency ﬁdelity to statutory policies and thereby increases the conﬁdence of aﬀected
citizens in the integrity of the decisionmaking process.”)
241Political pressure is not generally an appropriate inﬂuence on the Rx-OTC determination. However, political pressure that
keeps the FDA within Congress’ delegation of powers is essential to insuring accountability. For example, political pressure on
the FDA to limit its consideration to social harms that are generally accepted or realistically probable provides accountability.
By contrast, political pressure on the FDA to consider inappropriate social harms, as may have happened with Plan B, threatens
the independence and expertise of the administrative agency.
65